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PRELIMlliARY MEHORANDUM
I

--

1978 Conference
List~ Sheet 2

Februar~,

No. 77-983 r!. 5 X.

Cert to vJ'ashington
Supreme Ct from tNo
decisions w/ various
judges diss~~ting &
.
l/
concurrlng.

WASHINGTON

v.
WASHINGTON STATE
FbS3ENGER

l..

C0~1ERCIAL

FI3E:TI~G

SUMMARY:

State/Civil

Timely

VESSn:C.. ASS' N.

Petrs Washington State, Washington State Department

of Fisheries and the Director of that Department were enjoined by a

!I

The first is Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishinq VesseJ
Ass•n v. Tollefson {hereinafter Tollefso~). Judge ~osellini wrote for
the majority which included Hamilton, Bra~htenback and Hicks. Judges
St;-,_ fford and Wright concurred in the result only. Judge Utter dissentec
The second case is Puget Sound Guill netters Ass' n v. Moos · (hereL1after
Moos). Judge Rosellini again wrote for the majority which this time included Judges Wright; Hamilton, Brachtenback and Armstrong. Judges
Horowitz, Stafford and Utter concurred in part and dissented in pa~t.
'"..

·:.·

~j

- 2

federal DC from enacting any laws or regulations which interferred

\

.

with the fishing rights of the Indians under certain treaties (Medicine
Creek Treaties).

The Department, in an attempt to comply with the DC's

order, then promulgated regulations
500/o of harvestable run of fish.

which allowed the Indians to catch

The Washington Supreme Court struck

down the regulations as being in excess of the Department's statutory
authority and violative of the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.

Petrs raise a number of contentions ., but they

all seem to boil down to two questions:
treaties require the

~tate

(1} whether the above _mentioned

to restrict fishing by non-Indians in order

to provide a specified percentage of the fish to Indians; and

(2)

whether such a regulations would violate the equal protection clause.
As explained below, I am not entirely sure that this case actually
presents precisely thqse issues, but it is clear that the state and

federal courts have interpreted the applicable treaty and the Constitutic
of the United States in a conflicting manner.

It is likewise possible

those decisions place conflicting duties upon petrs.
2.

FACTS:

In the mid-1850's, the United States entered into a

series of treaties with Indians in the Northwest in ..which "the right
of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed, grounds and stations, is
further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the
Territory."

10 Stat. 1132, Medicine Creek Treaty.

been the subject of a great deal of litigation.

Y

y

Of

These treaties have
particul~r

concern

This Court has addressed questions arising under the treaties a
number of times. See, e.g., United States v. ' winans, 198 u.s. 371 (1905 :
Tulee v. Washinaton, 315 U.S. 681 (1942}; Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Depart ·
rnent of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I}; Department of Game·v.

.

.•

'
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(

in this case is an action commenced iri 1970 by the United States against
the State of Washington and its Department of Game and Fisheries to
enforce compliance with the above mentioned treaties.

The DC, in a

lengthy opinion, ultimately enjoined the defendants in that action
(petrs here) from enacting any laws or regulations which interfer)fed
with the fishing rights of the Indians under the treaties.

In particular

the DC held that while the state could promulgate reascinable regulations
for the purpose of conservation, the State could not regulate treaty
Indians from taking the harvestable run at their

11

usual

accustomed

grounds and stations" unless necessary to limit them to 50"/o of the
harvest on these grounds.
(\ ...._

United States v. Washington, 384 F.Supp. 312

(W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423

u.s.

1086 (1976).

Resps in the present action were not allowed to

intervene, but, according to the DC and CA, filed extensive amicus
briefs and participated almost as though they were parties at every
stage of the proceedings.
Petrs then promulgated regulations restricting the number of
fish that could be taken by non-Indians in order to allow the Indians
to take 50"/o of the fish.

One of the resps, an association of charter

boat operators, challenged in state court the regulations as they re-

\

duced the daily salmon limit for sports fishermen.

\

'\

.

invalidated the regulations.

The state Supreme Court initially dis-

'

I

~(

The lower court

\...._..,

)

']/ (Continued) :
Puya'llup Tribe, Inc., 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II) ; Puyallup Tribe,
Inc. v. Department of Game, 45 U.S.L.W. 4837 (June 23, 1977) (Puyallup
III).
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? l' lU~issed
I

'

the case as moot because the season to which the regulations

applied was over.

Upon rehearing, it decided it should address the

questions because they were important and of a recurring nature.
Tollefson case, fn. 1, supra).

(See

The court, with two judges dissenting,

affirmed the lower court, ruling that the Director of the Department
did not have the statutory authority to make an unequal allocation of
fish among members of the same class of user.

The basis for this

ruling was the court's finding that the Director did not promulgate
the regulations as a conservation measure, but rather in order to comply
with the federal DC's order~d that such a regulation would violate

-----the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.

~' ·
\

The

dissenting judges argued that this Court had rejected the argument that
the treaty violates the equal protection clause unless interpreted to
confer no greater rights than those held by non-treaty citizens.
United States v. Winans, 198

u.s.,

at 379, 3817 Puyallup I, 391 U.S., at

398, 402 n.l47 Puyallup II, 414 U.S., at 48-49.
Washington, 420

u.s. - 194,

See

205-206 (1975).

See also Antoine v.

They also disagreed with the

majority's interpretation of the Director's -powers.

At about the same

time, another one of the resps, a commercial fishing association, sought
in state court a writ of mandamus requiring the Director to restrict
fishing regulations to those necessary for conservation and to treat
Indian and non-Indian fishermen equally.
(

See Toos, fn. 1, supra.

The

Washington Supreme Court ultimately held in favor of resp, ruling that
the Director had authority to issue only regulations for . the purpose of

~

- 5

r

l

(--.

I

'

conservation and could not treat Indians and non-Indians differently

}/
because that result was not required under the treaties.

The court

thought the federal court action basically meaningless because not only
had the federal court misinterpreted the treaty, but a federal court canr
compel governmental officers to do what they are not authorized understa ·
law to do.

Supervisors v. United

States,~--· __ (lS ~~~-~- ]

f

(1873).

Three judges concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing the writ
should not issue because it would place the Director under conflicting

1

duties, but disagreeing on the court's further holding regarding the scop ,
of the Director's powers.

The United States and the Tribes did not seek

party status in either of these cases, but filed amicus briefs.
It is these two decisions from which petrs seek cert.

Other facts

will be given as relevant.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

decisions.

Petrs

~~-~)to~~riefly

on the merits o_f these

They argue that to the extent the state court decision bars

allocation of fishing rights to Indians, it is probably in conflict
with 'the applicable decisions of this Court.

In particular, they stress

a conflict with Puyallup III (see fn. 2, supra), in which this Court
'I

essentially approved an allocation of fish to

trea~

Indians.

The thrust of petrs argument in favor bf cert, however, is not
the wrongness of the decision below, but the fact that there is now a
conflict between the state and federal courts on the matter and that

v' the

conflict particularly effects petrs, subjecting them to apparently

}/ The court initially decline-d to issue the writ because "the
director will voluntarily abide by the court's decision." :Resps•renewed
their request for a mandamus order, however, and petrs inform us that
mandamus was issued on a preliminary basis by the Chief Justice of the
Wash.
Supreme Ct and is presently under consideration by the"whole
court.

- 6 -
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I

conflicting

\

duti~s.
J

They point out that the federal DC repeatedly en-

'

( joined the state court from deciding the matter, but these injunctions
l were simply ignored.

They also inform us that the Director has been

ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court
in both state and

fed~ral . court.

And yet, stresses the . Director, it

is impossible to comply with both the decisions.

/

A response has been filed by the commercial fishing association.
It too . thinks this Court ought to grant cert to resolve this conflict.
The association particularly stresses the fact that this involves the
construction of a treaty and the federal constitution, so it involves
· particularly important questions of federal law.

It also stresses the

violence engendered by the dispute between the Indians and non-Indians.
4.
•

DISCUSSION:

The conflict in this case is clear and the

Director appears to be . caught between the federal and state courts,
but I am not entirely sure whether the problem can be resolved through
review of this case.
It is clear the state and federal court disagree on the proper
interpretation of the treaty.

The state court held that the treaty

granted the Indians simply an "equal opportunity to fish."

-

court held in essence that the Indians were entitled to
harvestable fish in their usual fishing places.
court held that granting the Indians
(

'-.....-

equal protection clause.

5~/o

5~/o

Moreover~

The federal
of the
the state

of the fish would violate the

In light of the cases cited in fn. 2, supra,

particularly the three Puyallup ·cases,

I am inclined to . think the state

- 7 -
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(

court is wrong on both counts.

The problem, however, is that the very

first holding in each of the state court cases appears to be that the
Director does not have the power to issue regulations for any purpose
other than conservation (and since the regulations were issued for the
purpose of complying with a federal court order and not for the purpose
of conservation, they were beyond the scope of the Director's authority).
One still might argue that that presents a question of federal law
because it directly involves compliance with a federal court order.
am not so sure, however.
Washington

Suprem~

I

It seems to me that both petrs and the

court simply misconceive the federal court order.

As I read it, the DC did not order the state to promulgate regulations
(

limiting the catch of non-Indians to

5~/o.

Rather, it held that the

state could not issue regulations which violated the Indians' treaty
rights

(e.g., the state could issue conservation regulations as long

as they allowed the Indians at

least _ 5~/o

decree is formulated in those terms,

of the catchl.

Once the DC

it does not place the Director

f

under conflicting obligations, at leaslJ~ nder the conflicting obligationE
the Director claims to be under.

Rather, if, under state law, the

Director cannot issue regulations which conform to the DC order, then
the Director simply cannot issue any regulations which limit the
Indians' rights.
5~/o

Then,

I would think, if non-Indians take more than

of the fish, the United States government, as trustees for the

Indians, or the Indians themselves can go into federal court and enjoin
t~e

guilty parties (the federal DC has continuing jurisdiction over

I

8 thinks he
the matter).

Thus, the bind in which the Director/i~placed may be

more illusory than real and the threshold question in this case may
really be one largely of state law.
I think there is enough doubt about the matter, however, that the
court ought to call for the views of the S.G • . The federal government
plays an important role with respect to these Indians and these treaties.
The government also understands the exact scope of the DC's decision
and can giye us a much better idea of the exact nature ·of the conflict,
the Director's supposedly conflicting duties, and the questions really
presented for · review in this case.

And if, contrary to my initial

impression, the case really presents for review those questions which

( ""·
'l

petrs and resps claim are presented, then I think the case may well

.......,.

be certworthy.
There is one response.
2/13/78
CMS

-

Young

Wash. S. Ct. ops in
petn.

(

No. 77-983 CSX
WASHINGTON v.WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL ASS'N.
The SG has filed an amicus brief.

It supplements the factual

statement in this memo by noting that, as the state court litigation
gradually indicated that Washington would not be able to comply with the
federal court's judgment, the United States and the tribes again
invoked the continuing jurisdiction of the district court in
United St&tes v. Washington. That court issued a series of
~orders during August and September,

1977, designed to protect the

Indians' treaty rights. By orders dated August 10 and 31, 1977,
the federal court determined the treaty Indians' proper share
of

th~977

harvest and expressly removed that share from

the jurisdiction and control of the State of Washington.
The federal court also issued injunctions against the non,.

treaty fishermen, prohibiting all net salmon fishing in certain
specifically described geographic areas except during such times

j

and in such specific waters as were open by regulations conforming to the
court's prior orders.

/

The SG urges that the petn for cert be denied or that action on
it be deferred. Although the SG believes that the de.cisions by the
state courts on which petrs seek cert are incorrect as a matter of federal
law, he also believes that these cases do not provide an adequate or appropriate vehicle for resolution of the important conflict that exists between
the federal and state courts.

The cases awaiting eecision by the

federal court of appeals can be expected to provide a much more
suitable vehicle, and review of the controver_¥y by this
Court should await their presentation.
The. SG particmlarly emphasizes the incompleteness of the
record below. He argues that the reccrd in the federal cases pending
before CA 9 on the same issues will be much more complete and
review of those cases would, by any measure, be preferable to granting cert

- 2 in this case.

(

Finally, the SG questions whether there is presently any
final judgment in Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos
from which the State of Washington can seek review. Despite its
agreement with most of resps' arguments, the Wash. Sup. Ct.
declined-'

to issue a writ of mandamus against

the State or its

officials. Moreover, the proceeding has now been reopened by
the filing of
~ this

an emergency motion by reaps.

In the SG's view,

Court thus lacks jurisdiction over that case while it is still

pending in the state court.

Although a further order of the state court

might remedy the defect, for this Court to grant cert now would
be at least premature.

j

l

My own view is that cert should be denied. This Court
can veview the federal court judgmen t,now pending befoE£ CA 9,
on a more complete record than afforded in ·the state court cases.

KE

'

.

(

No. 77-983 CSX
WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL PASSENGER FISHING
VESSEL ASS'N.
Resps' Reply to SG's Amicus Brief has been received. It
makes several contentions.
1.

Resps take issue with the SG's assertion that the

case pending before CA. 9 will provide a more suitable
vehicle for resolution of the issues presented in this
petn.

Resps

claim . that at the time of oral argument

in CA 9, the 'presiding judge" of the panel stated that
the court would no:t review the

in t e r p:::e 1Ca tion "of the "in common

with" language in tre treaty provision--the

inte!."'p r eta~ion

of which, petrs claim, is of vital importance.
I do not find this argument to be very strong.
The interpretation of the "in common with" provision
is not the paramount · issue that resps would have us believe. In any

e·v ent,

-~ -

I think the Court should not put too much stock

in resps' prognosis as to what CA 9 will or will not decide when
it issues its opinion.
2.

The SG has argued that the record is incomplete in the

state cases.

Although resps claim that the issues to be

decided are issues of law not requiring a complete record,
resps state that they and petr are willing to permit the United
States to include with the record before this Court all or
(~

any part of the record in United States v. Washington.

.

.

,

..

- 2 3. The SG objects that the United States and the
Indian Tribes are not parties to-·the state cases. Resps
contend that the U.S. and the Tribes were invited by the
parties and the State Supreme Court to participate as
intervenors in those cases, and they refused.

On the other

hand, two of the resps in the state cases petitioned to
intervene in the federal case but their petitions were denied.
I see no particular relevance to resps' discussion
on this point.
· 4. The SG questions whether there is presently any
final judgment in Phget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos
(the state case) from which the state of Washington can
seek review.

Resps submit that the decision below became

final on October 10, 1977, when the Washington Supreme
Court denied a petn for rehearing in that case.

Resps

argue that their Oct. 7, 1977, emergency motion to which
the SG refers was a motion for purely remedial relief.

It in

no way affects the finality of the decision of the state Supreme
Court.
This disagreement is

·d~ffi~ult

access to the emergency motion.

to appraise without

However, I am inclined

to credit the SG's interpretation of the finality question
1 ~

over that of the resps.

The fact that resps have sought

only "remedial" relief (as opposed, I guess, to prospective
relief) in their emergency motion seems largely immaterial

...

+

l

t

- 3 -

(

to the finality question.

If further relief may be

forthcoming--based onthe merits of the dispute--the case
would seem to be non-final.
5.

La :st: l-.y ,..--- r~ ~-P.S.r state that, although they feel that

the state

cas~

before this Court are an adequate vehicle

to review the major issues in United States v. Washington,
particularly since the record in that case can be brought
before this Court, resps are willing to have the cases
~esently

pending before CA 9 consolidated with the

state cases before this Court for review of all the issues
raised by all these cases.
Because the two cases are so closely inter t wined,

~ it mig~c

be useful to hold this case until CA

9e s ~

decision is issued and cert is sought on that case.
I am still of the view, however, that the federal case is
the better vehicle for review of the issues here presented
and resps offer no persuasive reasons why the cases would have to
be consolidated.

3/1/78

(

..

'

Elli s on

Opinion in petn

,...

......

..

(

No. 77-983 CSX, WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL
PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL ASSN.
rhis case was held for CA 9's decision in
a related proceeding.

CA 9's opinion and judgment

having been received, the case is on the relist list
for May 18, 1978.
CA 9 affirmed the decision of the DC.

I

It is now

clear that the federal DC has, for all practical purposes,
~
taken over management of fishing rights in the state of
'WI'~

......

Washington.

----"""

~---

...

-------

.__....

·Tt is also clear that the state court decision

(from which cert is being sought in No. 77-983) conflicts
with the decision

(

J

o~

the federal DC and the CA 9 as to

the proper interpretation of the treaty.
Still, I do not think this case merits a grant.
As

e~plained

in the preliminary memorandum, at p. 7,

petrs and the Washington Supreme Court misconceive the
federal court order (now affirmed by CA 9). The DC did
not order the state to promulgate regulations limiting the
catch of non-Indians to 50%. Rather, it held only that the
state could not issue regulations which violated the Indians'
treaty rights.

Under this view of the DC's order, it does

not place the Director of the Dept. of Fisheries under
a conflicting set of obligations.
(

If the Director cannot,

under state law, issue regulations which conform to the DC
order, then the Director simply cannot issue any regulations

- 2 -

(

that limit the Indians' rights.

But, in any event,

the resolution of this question obviously-turns on
Washington law, not federal law.
The significant federal law question--i.e., the
proper interpretation of the

treaty--i ~ -presented

in the

case just decided by CA 9. If the Court wants to consider
i

J

the question, it will have a chance when cert is sought-as I am sure it will be--from CA 9's decision.
In the interim, however, there is no need to hold this
case further; .I would deny.

5/17/78
(
•
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 13,1978, Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 78-119
WASHINGTON

Cert. to CA 9 (Chambers,
Kennedy, and Jameson)

v.
UNITED STATES
PUGET SOUND GILLNETTE
ASSOCIATION

~

Federal/Civil

~

Timely

Cert. to CA 9 (Goodwin,
Wallace, and Kennedy)

v.
USDC

ON

Federal/Civil

Timely

2.

No. 78-139
PUGET SOUND
ASSOCIATION

t. to CA 9 (Goodwin,
and Kennedy)
~· wall

v.
USDC FOR WD OF WASHIN

TOa-:~Fed

Timely

~n.,
UNITED STATES

Cert. to W.O. Washington
( Bo 1 d t , D • J • )

v.
WASHINGTON

1.

Federal/Civil

Summary:

Timely

These two petitions arise from the

continuing controversy over the proper construction and
effective implementation of the fishing
rights
clauses
,...,
.....
..,.-,
.contained in the treaties between the United States and the
Pacific Northwest Indian tribes.
2.

Facts:

(a)

Procedural Posture in this Court.

In

No. 78-119, the State of Washington seeks review of two
decisions of the CA 9, Washington v. United States, 573 F.2d
1118 (April 24, 1978)("International Fishery casi), and Puget
Sound Gillnetters Assn v. USDC for the WD Washington, 573 F.2d
1123 (April 24, 1978)("Washington Fishery case").

In No. 78-

139, Puget Sound Gillnetters Association and other commercial
fishers associations seek review of the Washington Fishery
case.

They also seek direct review of the decision in United

States v. Washington, Civ.No. 9213 (W.D.Wash. June 6,

3.

1978)("1978 Enforcement Order").

The United States has filed a

single Brief in response to the two petitions.
The petitions in Nos. 78-119 and 78-139 are curvelined.

The two petitions are in turn straight-lined with

~~/,~ . ~~~J Washington
a#~~d.

v. Washinqton State Comm'l Passenger Fishinq Vessel

Assoc., No. 77-983, and this Memorandum assumes familiarity
with the facts stated in the Preliminary Memorandum in that

~~1 case.
~~~

The extensive Preliminary Memorandum in United States v.

Washington, No. 75-588, cert. denied, 423
1

u.s.

1086

(1976)("Treaty Case"), is also helpful.
(b)

Facts in Washington Fishery Case.

In response to

the Washington state court litigation at issue in No. 77-983,
the United States and the tribes invoked the continuing
jurisdiction of the DC in the Treaty Case.

The DC determined

the Indians share of the 1977 harvest and removed that share
from State jurisdiction.

When it appeared that State law

prevented the State's Department of Fisheries from enforcing
the resulting limit on non-treaty fishermen, the DC issued
injunctions against the non-treaty fishermen.

The injunctions

prohibited all net salmon fishing in specified geographic areas
except during such times and in such places as are authorized
by regulations conforming to the DC's basic allocation of the
harvest between treaty and non-treaty fishermen.

The DC

directed the State and the United States to cite any fisherman
who, having notice of the injunction, thereafter fished

4.

illegally, and to require him to appear before the DC to show
why he should not be held in contempt.
Both the non-treaty fishermen and the State sought
review of the DC's orders.

The CA 9 consolidated the appeals,

and upheld the orders entered by the DC, in the Washington
Fishery case.
(c)

Facts in the 1978 Enforcement Order.

In June

1978 the DC issued an order to govern fishing rights during the
1978 and subsequent fishing seasons.

According to the SG, that

order is in all material respects identical to the 1977 order
at issue in the Washington Fishery case.

A notice of appeal

from the 1978 Enforcement Order has been filed and the matter
is pending in the CA 9.
(d)

Facts in the International Fishery Case.

In the

Treaty Case, the State argued that the Convention of May 26,
1930, between the United States and Canada abolished Indian
treaty fishing rights with respect to Fraser River salmon.

The

Convention provides for an equal division of the catch of
Fraser River salmon between Canadian and American fishermen and
establishes the International Pacific Salmon Fisheries Comm'n
(IPSFC) to implement the agreement.

The IPSFC proposes

regulations each year to govern fishing in the Fraser River,
effective on approval of each nation.
The United States argued that the Convention was not
intended to affect the allocation of United States fishing

5.

rights between Indians and non-treaty fishermen.

The CA 9

agreed, but also concluded that all fishermen were bound by
IPSFC regulations.

When the United States was unsuccessful in

securing alteration of the IPSFC regulations to allow a special
treaty fishery, it withdrew its approval of a portion of the
1975 regulations of the IPFSC.

The DC then ordered the State,

which had incorporated the IPSFC regulations into its own laws,
to alter its regulations to permit a special treaty fishery on
the Fraser River.
The State appealed, and the CA 9 dismissed the case as
moot in the International Fishery decision.
3.

Decisions Below:

(a)

Washinqton Fishery Case.

The CA 9 began by reaffirming the construction given by it and
the DC to the fishing rights clause in the Treaty Case.

There

the treaty provision securing to the Indians "[t]he right of
taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations
••• in common with all citizens of the Territory" was
interpreted to interdict State regulation of Indian fishing
that would reduce the Indians' take below fifty percent of the
annual harvest.

The only exception is State conservation

regulations essential to the preservation of a particular run.
The CA 9 held that the different treatment of Indians
and non-Indians in the DC order is not an Equal Protection
violation.

In reaching its conclusion on this point, the CA 9

pointed to the quasi-sovereign status of the Indians under

6.

their treaties with the United States, reasoning that the
distinction drawn is a political and not a racial one.
The CA 9, noting the inability of the State to
regulate the fisheries in a manner assuring the Indians their
treaty rights, approved the 1977 regulation of the fisheries by
the DC.

It found that the DC regulations aimed at providing

non-treaty fishermen with 55 percent of the total opportunity
at the available harvest, and treaty fishermen 45 percent, and
that this allocation was consistent with the treaties.

It

found the DC's regulations reasonably suited to assure that the
Indians' share of the harvest would make it past the non-treaty
fishermen and up the runs to the treaty fisheries.
The CA 9 upheld the DC's orders that were directed at
fishermen and fishing associations not parties to the
Washington Fishery case.

It reasoned that in litigation over

the allocation of a natural resource held by the State in trust
for its people, citizens of the State are in privity with the
State.

Fishing rights are State-created, and any right of

private appropriation is derivative from State power and
control.

As authority, the CA 9 cited water law cases in which

States litigate their rights to water, and appropriators under
the States' laws are bound by those decisions without being
parties.
Judge Kennedy, concurring, recognized that the Treaty
Case made the "even apportionment" construction of the fishinq

7.

rights clause manadatory for the panel in the Washington
Fishery case.

But he also stated that "it has not been clearly

demonstrated that the rule of fifty percent apportionment is a
necessary and proper implementation of those treaty rights."
Judge Wallace joined Judge Kennedy's concurrence.
(b)

The 1978 Enforcement Order.

The 1978 Enforcement

Order continues the DC's regulation of the fisheries.

Review

is sought prior to CA 9 review.
(c)

International Fishery Case.

this case as moot.

The CA 9 dismissed

The 1975 IPSFC regulations, the subject of

the DC's order to the State, had been superseded by the time
the CA 9 decided the appeal.

Further, the United States has

removed treaty fishermen from IPSFC jurisdiction and now
regulates treaty fishing itself.

Therefore, the CA 9

concluded, there is little chance that the challenged orders of
the DC will be repeated.
4.

Contentions:

The State argues that the CA 9's

basic construction of the fishing rights clause, in the
Washington Fishery case, to require a fifty-fifty allocation is
erroneous, especially where the fishery is open and available
to all fishermen.

The State relies on the decision in

Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44
(1973), to indicate this Court's rejection of a specific
allocation based on the treaty, though the Court there only
indicated that it would not announce an allocation formula but

8.

would leave such a factual issue to the lower courts.

The

State stresses the misgivings of Judges Kennedy and Wallace,
and emphasizes that because certiorari was denied in the Treaty
Case, this Court has never passed on the merits of the treaty
construction issue.
The State contends that the CA 9 has reached
conclusions about the construction of the treaty and about the
equal protection question that are in conflict with the
decisions of the Washington Supreme Court at issue in No. 77983. The State also contents that this Court's previous
decisions have endorsed non-discriminatory regulation of
fishing, directed at necessary conservation, as consistent with
treaty rights, and that its regulation never went beyond
conservation.
Regarding the International Fishery case, the State
argues that the decision is not moot because the United States
is still pursuing the policy of allocating the Fraser River
harvest on a 50-50 basis between treaty and non-treaty
fishermen.
In addition to the points made by the State, the petrs
in No. 78-139 contend that the DC's orders in the Washinqton
Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order are significantly
different from the orders at issue in the earlier Treaty Case.
While the earlier order restrained the State from interfering
with the opportunity of treaty fishermen to take up to 50

9.

percent of the annual harvest, the present order runs against
individual fishermen and sets numerical limits on the catch
allowed to non-treaty fishermen.
These petrs stress the ruinous consequences of the DC
order for their commercial fishing industry.

They argue as

well that the DC, by ordering the State Department of Fisheries
to aid in enforcement of the DC's orders, has ignored the State
Supreme Court's ruling thas the Department has no authority to
engage in such activity.
Regarding the Enforcement Order of 1978, these petrs
contend that no meaningful review is likely in the CA 9 because
the 1978 Order is virtually the same as the 1977 order already
reviewed in the Washington Fishery case.

They urge the Court

to settle this question of treaty rights expeditiously by
accepting a direct appeal.
The SG does not oppose a grant of certiorari in the
Washington Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order, but
does maintain that the International Fishery case is moot.
SG states that the conflicting

decisio~s

The

of the CA 9 and the

Washington Supreme Court on both the treaty construction and
the enforcement issues have caused a serious breakdown in the
-------------~

enforcement of fisheries regulations in Washington.

The SG

contends that only resolution of the conflict by this Court
will allow a return of control of the fisheries to the State
and ensure State enforcement of the treaty rights of the

10.

Indians, relieving the federal government of the substantial
enforcement burden it bears currently.

-----

The SG identifies the central issue in the Washinqton
Fishery case and the 1978 Enforcement Order as the

-----

-----

interpretation of the fishing rights clause.

_.-.--........

,_

~

He agrees with

petrs that the conflict between the CA 9 and the Washington
Supreme Court is substantial, and does not think that this
Court's denial of certiorari in the Treaty Case forecloses the
issue at the present time.

The SG concludes that the Court

should review both the Washinqton Fishery case and the
Washington Supreme Court decisions in No. 77-983 on the treaty
interpretation issue.

The SG also urges the Court to resolve

this litigation once and for all by also reviewing the DC's
enforcement orders.

______....__

Respondent Yakima Nation urges the Court to deny
certiorari.

A grant, in this resp's view, will only strengthen

the State's resistance to the DC's orders and thus provoke
continued lawlessness in the fisheries.

The resp urges a

denial of the petitions accompanied by an opinion disapproving
the State's position--a kind of summary affirmance of the CA 9
decision.
Other Indians tribes, as respondents, urge that the
State cases in No. 77-983 are contrived.

They also argue that

the treaty interpretation question was decided in the !reaty
Case, and should not be relitigated now.

Further, they contend

11 •

that because the DC has now taken over the enforcement burden
itself, removing jurisdiction over the fisheries from the
State, the State cases are moot.

Finally, they point out that

review by this Court cannot cure the

enforc~ment

problems

created by the state law incapacity of the Washinton Department
of Fisheries to enforce any rules other than conservation
measures.
5.

Discussion:

The misgivings of Judges Kennedy and

Wallace about the justification for the "even apportionment"
interpretation of the fishing rights clause argue in favor of
reviewing that question.

Now that the treaty interpretation

first announced in the Treaty Case has been particularized
fully in the DC's regulations, the issue is ripe for review.

I

Because all of the parties agree that the 1977 and

1978 DC regulations differ only in some details, there seems to

be no reason to grant the petn for review of the 1978
Enforcement Order before a decision by the CA 9 in that case.

The CA 9 will be able to apply a decision by this Court in the
Washington Fishery case to the appeal of the 1978 Enforcement
Order.
The basis for the SG's optimism about the effect of a
decision by this Court on the willingness of the State to
enforce the Indians' treaty rights is unclear.

If no state

officer is authorized by State law to undertake such duties,
that incapacity will not be removed by this Court's holding on

12.

federal treaty and constitutional issues.
Even if there is little likelihood that the State will
assume the burden of enforcing the Indians' treaty rights,
however, review of the state court decisions in No. 77-983 in
conjunction with the Washington Fishery case still may be
important.

The Washington Supreme Court held not only that the

State Department of Fisheries has no legal authority to enforce
other than conservation regulations, but also that the
Department has a statutory duty "to authorize the harvesting of
salmon not required for spawning" and that it "may restrict the
harvesting of salmon by the commercial fishermen only to the
extent that no surplus exists and that the restriction is
necessary to prevent the impairment of the supply of salmon".
The Washington court held that the Department may not "allocate
fish among competing claimants for purposes other than
conservation," and may not "allocate fish to treaty Indians or
to non-Indians."

Any action by the Department that is

consistent with this declaration of duty will be inconsistent
with the interpretation of the fishing rights clause in the
Treaty Case and the Washington Fishery case.

But the

Washington Supreme Court interpreted the fishing rights clause
differently from the federal courts, holding that it only
requires equal opportunity in the fisheries for all fishermen.
As a consequence, State officials are under a state statutory
duty to regulate in a manner inconsistent with federal law as

13.

declared by the federal courts but consistent with federal law
as declared by the Washington courts.
When the Washington Supreme Court reached its
decisions in the cases in No. 77-983, it

d~..:clined

to issue

mandamus to the Department of Fisheries because of its
confidence that the Department would follow its directions.
Subsequently, a state superior court ordered

the Department of

Fisheries to issue regulations inconsistent with the DC
regulations upheld in the Washington Fishery case, and the DC
enjoined the state superior court from enforcing its order

•

against the Department of Fisheries.

See Washington Fishery

case, petn in No. 78-119, at A-20 to A-21.

This episode

exemplifies the possibility of continuing disputes between the
..............

,....-.,~

...-.

~~

state and federal courts until the disagreement over the
requirements of the fishing rights clause and the Equal
Protection clause is settled.
The International Fishery case was dismissed properly

I

as moot.
There are several responses to each of the two
\

.: ·.

, \

petitions.
10/4/78
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 13,1978, Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 78-139
PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS
ASSOCIATION

Cert. to CA 9 (Goodwin,
Wallace, and Kennedy)

v.
Timely

USDC FOR WD OF WASHINGTON

Federal/Civil

UNITED STATES

Cert. to W.D. Washington
( Bo 1 d t , D • J • )

v.
WASHINGTON

Federal/Civil

Timely

Please see Preliminary Memorandum in No. 78-119.

'·

BB

10/6/78

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
To:

Justice Powell

Re:

No. 78-119, Washington Fishery and International Fishery Cases
The State has filed a Reply to the SG's Response to the petn.

The State renews its argument that the International Fishery case
is not moot.

In support of this argument, it includes copies of

two letters.

Both concern Canadian protests against the United

States' domestic regulation of Indian fisheries on the Fraser
River.
As I understand it, the DC ordered only that the State rescind
a portion of the 1975 IPSFC regulations.

It did not order the U.S.

to undertake domestic regulation of the fisheries previously
regulated by the IPSFC, nor did it approve such regulation.

I Acontinuing

V\not

-

The

dispute between the IPSFC and the U.S. State Dep't -does

c.;;:-

affect the mootness of the International Fishery case.

-

.-""'\

October 13, 1978
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 . . .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

7A-139

PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS ASSN.
vs.

U. S. DIST. CT., WASH.

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

Burger, Ch. J .......... .
Brennan, J ........................... .
Stewart, · J ...................... .
White, J ....................... .
Marshall, J .......................... .
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .
Powell, J .............. .
Rehnquist, J ........... .
Stevens, J. ... ................. . .....

MERITS
N

REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

October 13, 1978
Court ................... .

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .................. , 19 . . .

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 . . .

No.

78-119

WASHINGTON
vs.

UNITED STATES

HOLD
FOR

CERT.
G

D

JUR/ SDlCTION AL
sfi'ATEMEN'l'
N

POST

DIS

AFF

v·........... .. .

Burger, Ch. J .................. ·\ ...
Brennan, J ........................................... .
Stewart, J ............................................ .
White, J ......................... ·)

................ .

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... .
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .
Powell, J ........................... .
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . .... · -)- · . . . . ........... .
Stevens, J ....................

J ...... ............ .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ·LI ...................... .

MERITS
REV

AFF

MOTION
G

D

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

October 13, 1978

e

Court

Voted on .................. , 19 .. .

Argued ................... , 19 .. .

Assigned .... '.............. , 19...

Submitted ................ , 19 . . .

Announced ................ , 19 .. .

No.

77-9R3

WASHINGTON
vs.

WASH. STATE COMMERCIAL

Relisted.

CERT.

HOLD
FOR

G

D

JURISDICTIONAL
STATEMEN'l'
N

POST

DIS

MERITS

AFF

REV

MOTION
G

AFF·

ABSENT

NOT VOTING

D

V:.

Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . ..... .

Brennan, J ..................... V.. . . . .

. ............... .

Stewart, J ..................... ~- !;;·

. ............... .

White, J ......................

. .

V .... ................ .

Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
. . . . . . . . ............... .
Blackmun, J ................... ~ . . . . . ............... .
Powell, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....

V ...l ........ ·~ . .. ...

Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . :( ........ f ~-

q... .

. .C.J.r; .

y. ......... I. ~ ...... I! . . .

Stevens, J ................ .
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

0

0

••

•••••••••••••••••••

. ..
0

0

•••

0

•••

0.

0

•

0

0

•••••••••••••

0

•••••

0.

0

0

(. C fJ ~soL' JcLIt,)
c).

"'/f.u r.>

Se. f- bri, {;7} s c.he-Ju fe as
Gl~

f·

3 .,5 ~+,a
1 II\

~j

'0" .. ~"+

d lfC u))io"

Lf. ~~i t

l)a.sk'.s ref f1 t'S

re ce..i ve.. ~
r(!_

d1111'> i o"
o Vl f· '-()

6(? +a t'f

as
11

o

c {)A.~ re

a.//"d o
-f

J'tt'"f /

Usf- mo+;o(\s .("~~" tc{to CCJr..q_

November 3, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 77-983
WASH.

Motion of Solicitor General to
Consolidate.
Also Motion of Certain Indian Tribes
to Consolidate.

v.
WASH. STATE COMMERCIAL
PASSENGER FISHING
No. 78-119

(Same)

WASH.

v.
UNITED STATES
No. 78-139

(Same)

PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS
ASSN.

v.
USDC FOR WD WASH.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS:

On October 16, the Court granted cert in
c.A 'f
these three cases, consolidating the second two (state ~ cases) and
Wash. S. C.:f-.

setting them for argument (1 hr.) in tandem with the first
case) •

(a federal

The SG moves for consolidation of all three cases for briefing

and argument.

- 2 1.

The SG requests consolidated briefing because all the cases

turn
~on

the nature and scope of the treaty fishing rights reserved by

Indians of the Pacific Northwest, although there are certain differences
between the issues raised.

Judicial economy would best be served if

each party was able to address this question in a single opening brief.
Further, the cases raise issues concerning the proper division of
authority between the state and federal judicial systems, which can
be addressed most logically, efficiently, and clearly in single briefs.
Consolidation would eliminate considerable duplication and crossreferencing.

Moreover, the SG believes that the parties to the state

case are not true

adversarie~

since the goal of both is to overturn

.s-zo r..zd

the original decision in United States v.

6741 (91-f &r . / J7.7jJ 1 c~,_r,

~vashington _,

*I

"

c/.,..;7n:4',
/0$(1

.Y..Z-3

c/.S.

{/97t;;.) .

The Indian Tribes-and the fishing associations agree the cases
should be consolidated.

The Clerk has spoken with Wash. by telephone

and it too agrees the cases should be consolidated.
2.

The SG suggests the following briefing schedule:
Opening brief for Wash. 45 days from grant.
Opening brief for non-Indian fishing
associations 20 days from receipt of
Wash.' s brief.
Resp's briefs from U.S. and Indians
30 days later.
Reply briefs from Wash. and fishing
associations as permitted by Rule 41(3).

All parties concur in this schedule except Wash., which advised
the Clerk it was mailing its own proposed schedule on October 31.
(Apparently, Wash. believes the SG's schedule gives the U.S. too
much time}.

ctt

*/The Indians' motion was filed on behalf of all Tribes except
the Yakima Indian Nation; there is no explanation for this exclusion.

-

3.

3 .,..

The SG also proposes that the two hours allotted for

argument of these cases be divided as follows:
30 minutes for Wash.
30 minutes for fishing associations
30 minutes for U.S.
30 minutes for Indians
This division recognizes the four distinct entities in these cases.
The present division would give the parties opposing United States v.
Washington 90 minutes to argue, and those supporting the decision only
30 minutes.

The Indians concur with this proposal.

The fishing associations recognize that the present allocation
of time may be "marginally disproportionate,"but think the SG's suggestion goes too far in the other direction. They suggest the following:
40 minutes for Wash.
40 minutes for fishing associations
40 minutes for United States and Indians
This recognizes that the Indians and the United States, which sued
as their trustee, have identical interests.
state and the associations differ on

wheth~r

On the other hand, the
the state has the author-

ity to enforce a preferential division of the catch in favor of the
Indians.

Furthermore, the state has no interest at all in whether

the associations may be bound by the original federal

proceeding~to

which they were not parties)on a theory of privity with the state;
in fact, the state consented

~o

the issuance of federal orders running

directly against the associations.
Wash. is also submitting its views on an appropriate division
of a:rgument time.

- 4 DISCUSSION:

1.

The consolidation of these cases seems

*I

desirable and is supported by all parties.2.

The proposed briefing schedule is reasonable, and is

supported by all except Wash.

If Wash. 's submission has not been

received before Conference, the Court might want to relist the motions
for next week. (The Clerk advises this would not upset his schedule,
although

obviousl~

the sooner the parties know about consolidation,

the better.)
3.

Neither of the suggested divisions of argument seem

satisfactory.

Essentially this is a dispute between the U.S. and Wash.,

the former representing the Indians and the latter its citizens.

Thus,

the bulk of the time should go to the ·main parties, with some time
allowed for the Indians and the associations to present their special
views or issues.

This view is reflected in the following schedule:

45 minutes for Wash.
15 minutes for the associations
45 minutes for the U.S.
15 minutes for the Indians
However, the Court might want to wait

for

Wash. ' s views.

There is a reply from the fishing associations.
11/1/78
PJC

Richman

~If the Court does not consolidate, the SG alternatively
requests 15 minutes to argue as amicus in the state case, with no
additional time for the other side. The fishing associations agree
with this request; Wash.'s views are not known.

The Indians also move alternatively for 15 minutes to argue as
amicus in the state cases, with no additional time for the other side.
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Motion of Solicitor General to
Consolidate.
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PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS
ASSN.

v.
USDC FOR WD WASH.
See Memorandum No. 77-983.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
November 10, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 78-139
PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS
ASSN.

Response of Wash. to Motion of
Solicitor General to Consolidate
and Also to Motion of Certain
Indian Tribes to Consolidate

v.
USDC FOR WD WASH.

.

See Memorandum No. 77-983.
11/8/78
PJC

Richman
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
November 10, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 78-119
WASH.

v.

Response of Wash. to Motion of
Solicitor General to Consolid~te
and Also to Motion of Certain
Indian Tribes to Consolidate

UNITED STATES
See Memorandum No. 77-983.
11/8/78
PJC

Richman
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November 3, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
Motion of Solicitor General to
Consolidate.
Also Motion of Certain Indian Tribes
to Consolidate.

No. 78-119
WASH.

v.
UNITED STATES
See Memorandum No. 77-983.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
November 10, 1978 Conference
List 3, Sheet 3
No. 77-983

Response of Wash. to Motion of
Solicitor General to Consolidate
and Also to Motion of Certain
Indian Tribes to Consolidate

WASH.

v.
WASH. STATE COMMERCIAL
PASSENGER FISHING
No. 78-119

(Same)

WASH.

v.
UNITED STATES
No. 78-139

(Same}

PUGET SOUND GILLNETTERS
ASSN.

v.
USDC FOR WD WASH.
WASH.'S CONTENTIONS:
consolidation.

1.

Wash. does not object to the proposed

However, it asks the Court not to require a single

appendix for both sets of cases, because the designations have already
been sent to opposing counsel.

A requirement that the appendices be

.

...

- 2 consolidated would require service of additional designations on
counsel not in both suits.

This would delay preparation of the

appendices, which must be filed by November 30.

2.

Wash. objects to the proposed division of argument on the

same grounds as the fishing associations, and agrees with their
counter proposal.

Wash. stresses that their positions are adverse

on the question of state power.

3.

Wash. objects that the proposed briefing schedule gives

the government and the Indians 50 days to prepare their responses to
the state's brief.

Wash. suggests the following schedule:

Wash.'s Brief
Association~

November 30, 1978
Brief

December 14, 1978
January 6, 1979

SG and Indians

This would give the U.S. and Indians 37 days to respond to the state's
brief and 23 days to respond to the fishing associations' brief; and
would allow adequate time for a reply brief, if the case is set for
argument during the February 20-28 session.
DISCUSSION:

Under the SG's

propos~d

briefing schedule, the

government's brief would be due January 19, leaving more than a month
for a reply brief.

The SG will probably need at least 50 days anyway,

so there is no reason to cut down on its time.
changes

Nothing in the response

-

my suggestion for division of argument (p. 4 of original memo).

A single appendix would be more convenient for the Court.

Wash. 's

problem is illusory, because it can simply put its two separate appendices under one cover (with one index and numbered straight through),
and eliminate any duplication of documents.

If the Court agrees, it

can instruct the Clerk to so advise the parties.
11/8/78
PJC

Richman
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Bobtail Bench Memorandum
To:

Justice Powell

v. Washington State Commercial Pass~ J~ . ~
Fisfi1ng Vessel Ass 1 n, No. 11 l~t:;~ s~c~
r~
~
""
"'-/We/#~ &IP~
/5") Washi ~ v. United States, No. 78-119
.
L7
U>.... ~ JZ(; c #fZJ ,. J t-~-· • .l... 1 '1 7 7 tAT .. ..,c...l.c..,v... ~
~ Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. U.S. District
~ ~~
( / / Court, 78-139 Ji. c 1 q 7 g-~ -~
~

Re:

~ ashington

L[

!:(I '

~~

'0:t

<=A~

In these cases the Court

~s

called upon to review the

decisions of three different courts--the Ninth Circuit, the
Western District of Washington, and the Washington Supreme
Court--concerning a single, long-standing dispute over Indian
fishing rights in the area of the Puget Sound.
_..

"-"'

Three basic

2.
questions are presented.

---

First, is the correct interpretation

of two treaties concerning fishing rights a question properly
before the Court, even though the question was raised in prior
proceedings in which the Court denied certiorari?

Second, what

is the correct interpretation of the fishing rights treaties?
Third,
________., what is the proper remedy for violations of the Indians'
rights under the treaties, and against whom may this remedy be
directed?
The dispute in this case centers around two midnineteenth century treaties between the United States and the

--

Indians, in which the Indians gave up substantial tracts of
land in exchange for a promise that they would be allowed
fishing rights off of their reservation "in common" with the
citizens of what then was a territory.

At the outset, the

precise meaning of these words was not important, as there was
an ample supply of fish for Indians and non-Indians alike.

By

the middle of this century, however, the supply had dwindled,
and the question of apportioning in time of scarcity was raised
for the first time.

Thus, in 1970 the United States, acting on

behalf of the Indians, brought suit in the Western District of
Washington, asking the court to ':.··'
determine what the Indians'
fishing rights were under the treaties, and whether Washington
State fishing regulations were inconsistent with those rights,
insofar as they liberally allowed non-Indians to fish in the
Puget Sound area.
In 1974, the District Court issued its opinion in

3.

b<

which it found that "in common" as used in the treaties meant
that neither Indians nor non-Indians could take so many fish as

~C
~

to endanger the resource,
share" of the fish.

~d

that each was entitled to a "fair

The court concluded that the Indians were

not allowed such a share under Washington regulations, as nonIndians harvested most of the crop of Salmon and Trout before
the fish reached the upstream locations where the Indians were
allowed to fish.
officials:

~

Accordingly, the court ordered State

(1) to stop regulating Indian fishing, save insofar

as regulation was required to preserve the resource of the
fishery; and (2) to enact regulations restricting non-Indian
fishing to a

certain . ~ercentage ~uqhly

-

50%h of the harvest.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court decision in
,..-

~

-._,.

~

virtually all respects in 1975, and in 1976 this Court denied
certiorari.

All the subsequent litigation, including each of

the three cases now before the Court, grew out of the District
Court's attempts to enforce the judgment it entered in 1974.
From 1974 through 1976 various actions were filed in
Washington courts in which injunctions were sought and obtained
against State officials' complying with the federal district
~

l t

court order.

Finally, in 1977 the

~ ashington

Supreme Court

ruled that State officials could not adopt regulations giving
special concessions to Indian fishermen.
decision on two theories.

Fi~st,

The court based its

it said that such regulations

were beyond the state officials' authority to promulgate as a
matter of state law.

Second, .it opined that giving a

l'i7f

4.
preference to Indians would violate the Equal Protection
Clause.

This is the decision before the Court now as No. 77-

983.
With the 1977 Washington Supreme Court ruling,
compliance with the 1974 District Court order came to a halt.
In response, the District Court in 1977 issued an enforcement
order in which it did three things.

First, it took upon itself

the task of allocating the 1977 fishery among Indians and nonIndians, reasoning that if this task was beyond the ken of
Washington officials, it had to be handled by the federal
courts.

Second, the court enjoined State officials from

permitting non-Indians to harvest fish over the limit the court
set.

Finally, the court issued an injunction directly against

i}c

the non-Indian fishermen, reasoning that, although the
fishermen were not themselves parties to the federal
proceedings, they were in privity with the State of Washington.
Thus, the State had largely been representing their interests
throughout the litigation, and the fishermen had

..

~

participated as amici at virtually every phase of the
litigation.

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

_c~--~ __,

This
.k
enforcement ruling is the second case now before the Courtf r r - - - .

----

review, No. 78-119.
Finally, Xn 1978 the Federal District Court issued an
enforcement order similar to its 1977 order.

Although this

case has not been passed upon by the Ninth Circuit, it is
before this Court on writ of certiorari in case No. 78-139.

~

5.
1.

~the

treaty interpretation before the Court?

The SG urges the Court not to reconsider the District
Court's 1974 interpretation of the treaty, noting that that
decision was before the Court in 1976 and certiorari was
denied.

Indeed, the Government argues that the 1974 decision

would have been final, but for the parties' blatant
disobedience of the federal court orders.

Thus, the SG

suggests that it would be wasteful to review this decision at
this date and, what is worse, review would encourage parties in
future law suits to do their best to frustrate federal court
orders in order to keep an issue alive.
There is a great deal of appeal to the SG's position,
seems to me that the non-Indian fishermen and the
Washington courts have been remarkably intransigent throughout
t QLs litigation.

Nonetheless, I am reluctant to allow an issue

of this magnitude and controversy to be resolved without some
authoritative word from this Court.

I fear, therefore, that

the merits of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
treaties should be
2.

Treaty interpretation

If the Court reaches the question of the
interpretation of the provision for "common" fishing in the
treaties, it will face a difficult question.

I~

On the one hand,

it seems ridiculous that .027% of the population of Washington
~-

should be entitled to 50%
_____, of the fish.

On the other hand, at

the time the treaties were drafted the Indians in the region

6.
outnumbered the non-Indians and so, insofar was the parties to
the treaty were concerned, it probably would not be remarkable
that the Indians would get at least half of the fish.

The real

difficulty, of course, is that the parties to the treaty never
considered the problem presented here.

The Government,

however, seems right in contending that the treaties must have
meant something more than just that the Indians would be
allowed to fish like everyone else--they had this right absent
the treaty.

If it is assumed that the treaties preserved some

special rights of the Indians to fish, it is hard to draw a
line short of the lower courts' 50%.
3.

Relief in this case

The State and commercial fishing associations' weakest

-

argument, it seems to me, is with the extraordinary remedies
resorted to by the District Court.

From the description in the

Government's brief, it appears that the District Court has been
taxed beyond all reasonable bounds, and that it has been forced
to resort to draconian methods of protecting its jurisdiction;
In sum, I think I would affirm the federal courts'
rulings, and reverse the Washington Supreme Court ruling.

I

hasten to add, however, that I have spent only a few hours on
the 26 briefs filed in this case, and so my attention has
largely been devoted to figuring out the proceedings, rather
than analyzing the law.
2/27/79

David
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CHAMBERS OF

/

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

...

..

May 9, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983

Puget Sound/Washington State Fishing Case

Dear John:
.,

My position with respect to your recently circulated memorandum in this case is very much that stated by Lewis in hiD
note to you of May 9th.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

.....
J'

"·

~:.

May 9, 1979

77-983 Puqet Sound/Washington State Fishing Case

Dear John:
I have read with interest and admiration your
memorandum. It is well written and persuasive.
My vote at Conference was, however, the "other way"
particularly with respect to the meaning of "right in
common". I have not thought that this meant a 50/50 division
between Indians and non-Indians.
I am not disposed to write, but will await other
circulations before coming to r.est. The really important
thing is to settle this controversy.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

...

',, .

..

·l

<qottrl o-f tltt ~tti.Ub- ,®m.tcs
~a:sJ:rhtg-tcn. tB. <q. 20g7)!.~'

.§up-rtntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMU N

May · ll, 1979

~·

Re:

Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139 -Washington Fish cases

Dear John:

....

This indeed was a large task.
I am prepared to join
your memorandum if and when it is converted into an
opinion, with the following reservations:
l.
I think I would prefer to affirm flatly the
judgment in No. 78-119. This is the International
Fisheries case, and the memorandum agrees with the CA9 that
the case is moot.
2. On page 35, there is an indication that the Court
will not grant certiorari in the enforcement cases.
I
believe those cases are being held for this one and prefer
not to prejudge them even though I agree that it is
unlikely that certiorari in those cases will be granted.
Sincerely,

...

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference

~u:prt'lm

<qattrl af flrt ~lt ~tait.s'

'Jl'rurJrhtgtmt. ~. <!f.
CHAMBERS OF"

May 14, 1979

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

ZOb7Jl.~

Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 139 State of Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing, etc.

Dear John:
Your memorandum is a splendid job and r•d be happy
to join it as a Court opinion.

Sinc~rely,
I

;

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc: The Conference

'

.:§npr.em.t

<!Jomi of flrt 'Jltnittb .:§tatt.tr

:.rurltin:ghtn. ~. <ij.

20c?J!~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
May 14, 1979

Re.:

.,

7

'7

7S-983, 7-3-119, 78-139- Washington
Fish Cases

\.

Dear Harry:
Many thanks for your note.
Both of your
suggestions are good ones and will be adopted
in our next draft--which will include quite a
number of minor changes.

.·
... ~.

Mr. Ju.s tice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference
'

~·.

''
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May 31, 1979

Memorandum
To:
From:

Mr. Justice White

~

Michael E. Gehringer, Assistant Librarian for
Research Services

Subject:

Effect of Revised Statutes §5596 (1874) on
the Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, §1, 4 Stat.
729 (1834)

This memorandum is in response to your inquiry
regarding the effect of Revised Statutes §5596 (1874) on
the Act of June 30, 1834, c.l61, §1, 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
Strict application of §5596, the consistent practice of
this Court in regard to §1, and scholarly commentary on
the definition of "Indian country," all concur that §1 was
repealed by §5596.
In practice, however, this Court relied
on the provisions of the repealed §1 to determine the
geographical limits to the application of the criminal
sanctions of Revised Statutes §§2127-2157 (1874). This
practice continued until 1948, when, with the revision of
title 18 of the U.S. Code, a new statutory definition of
"Indian country," (based on this Court's decisions construing
§1) was adopted (18 u.s.c. §1151[1976]).
A brief but thorough analysis of the history of the use
of the §1 definition of "Indian country" can be found in
Federal Indian Law 12-17 (1958). We have sent a copy for
your use w1th this memorandum.
JUDICIAL HISTORY
This Court has consistently ruled that §1 was repealed
by §5596 whenever it has been presented with that question.
The principal cases in this area, many of which explicitly
admit the repeal of §1 before going on to fashion judicial
definitions and extensions for the term "Indian country"
based on §1, are the following:

- 2 Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877)
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883)
U.S. v. LeBr1s, 121 U.S. 278 (1887)
U.S. v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909)
Clairmont v. U.S. 225 U.S. 551 (1912)
Donnelly v. U~ 228 U.S. 243 (1913)
U.S. v. SandovaT 231 U.S. 28 (1913)
U.S. v. Pelican 232 U.S. 442 (1914)
u.s. v. Ramsey--· 211 u.s. 4 61 <19 2 6)
U.S. v. McGowan 302 U.S. 535 (1938)
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
4 Stat. 729, §l (1834)
While several sections from this Act were ultimately
codified as part of the Revised Statutes, §1 was not included
in the revision. The definition in §1 had not been repealed
or amended in any way prior to 1874, but doubts as to its
continuing validity were apparent in the Commissioner's
Draft codification of this section, and the accompanying
notes (photocopies are attached). This proposed section
was not part of the final revision and was never enacted.
Revised Statutes §5596 (1874)
This section was first introduced on the floor of the
House on the final day of House proceedings on the Revised
Statutes, April 1, 1874. A limited amount of floor discussion
took place in the House, and later in the Senate, regarding
the operation of this section. The discussion tended to
restate the plain meaning of the effect and purpose of the
section. (We have sent the proper volumes for your use.)
An earlier version of a repealer section appeared as
Title I, §3 of the Commissioner's Draft (photocopy attached).
This Court's treatment of the effect of §5596 on omitted
sections of otherwise included Acts has, again, been mainly
consistent. One of this Court's earliest and clearest
explications of the effect of §5596 in such situations can be
found in u.s. v. Claflin, 97 u.s. 546, 548 (1878). As noted
above, thrs-court has consistently applied §5596 as repealing
§1 of the 1834 Act.
In an analogous situation, this Court
in Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 522 n. 23 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) dealt w1th a section of a 1793 navigation act

- 3 that was never expressly repealed prior to 1873, had been
part of the Commissioner's Draft, but never appeared in
the Revised Statutes. That section was "deemed to have ,
been repealed, because of the omission" from the Revised
Statutes. Id. The most recent comment by this Court on
the effect-of §5596 on omitted statutory sections appears
in your dissenting opinion in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 207 (1976).
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June 1, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

/
Re:

Nos. 77-983, 78-119, 78-139 - Washington Fish cases

Dear John:
I am with you. I shall join an opinion prepared along the
lines of your memorandum as recirculated May 31.

Sincerely,

/tHf

Mr. Justice Stevens
cc:

The Conference
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.JUSTICE .J OHN P AUL STEVE N S

June 1, 1979

Re:

78-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington
v. Fishing Vessel Assn.

Dear Potter:
Thank you for your letter and kind words about
my memorandum in this case.
Your reference to "a
basic 50-50 allocation of the available fish between
Indians and non-Indians" prompts me to add a few
more words, howeve~, to the already too many that I
have written on the subject.
First, I'm afraid that the memorandum may not make
as clear as it should that the Indians would not be
allocated 50% of the "available fish" in Washington.
Instead they could take no more than 50% of those fish
that pass through their traditional fishing areas, which,
as I understand it, amounts to about 50% of half of the
anadromous fish in the area.
Second, the "p~that is
being divided "between Indians and non-Indians" does
not include those fish that would later have passed
through traditional fishing sites but instead are
taken by non-Indian fishermen who are not citizens of
Washington~
In short, even if the Indians' share were
frozen at 50%, it would only amount to about 20% of the
total number of fish in the area.
Third, that number
may drop still further when the District Court resolves
the question of hatchery-bred fish which, if the
Puyallup litigation is any guide, may be ·excluded from
the "pie." In fact, that could result in the exclusion
of up to half of the fish in some "runs," as it did in
the Puyallup case. Fourth, the Indians' share is not

J

- 2 -

frozen at 50%. As footnote 26 indicates, that is a
ceiling, but not a floor, and the District Court has
already dropped the Indrans' share below that point
by 10% after its most recent assessment of the Indians'
needs. Accordingly, even if the hatchery-bred fish
are not excluded, the 20%-of-the-total estimate above
is too high.
Finally, I should point out that the
modifications to the decree proposed in the memorandum
significantly alter the manner in which the Indians'.
share is to be calculated, so that they will not receive
the benefit of the District Court's exclusion of
reservation-taken, subsistence, and ceremonial fish.
All. in all, therefore, the Indians will probab~y end
up taking between 15 and ' 20% of the Washington anadromous fish, which seems to me to be quite consistent
with the treaty language and the intent of the parties
to the treaty.

I, of course, would be willing to emphasize these
points more adequately than I have yet done if you
think that would be helpful.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

June 1, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

77-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington v.
Fishing Vessel Assn.

Dear John:
Please forgive my delay in responding to
your admirably conscientious and thorough memorandum, for which we all owe you a debt of gratitude.
As of now, I cannot bring myself to believe
that the treaty la~guage implies a basic 50-50
allocation of the available fish between Indians
and non-Indians.
I understand that Bill Rehnquist
is preparing a short memorandum, and I shall wait
to see what he says before finally co~ing to rest.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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.JUST ICE .JOHN PA UL S TEVE N S

June 1, 1979

Re:

78-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington
v. Fishing Vessel Assn.

Dear Potter:
Thank you for your letter and kind words about
my memorandum in this case.
Your reference to "a
basic 50-50 allocation of the available fish between
Indians and non-Indians" prompts me to add a few
more words, however, to the already too many that I
have written on the subject.
First, I'm afraid that the memorandum may not make
as clear as it should that the Indians would not be
allocated 50% of the "available fish" in Washington.
Instead they could take no more than 50% of those fish
that pass through their traditional fishing areas, which,
as I understand it, amounts to about 50% of half of the
anadromous fish in the area.
Second, the "p1.e" that is
being divided "between Indians and non-Indians" does
not include those fish that would later have passed
through traditional fishing sites but instead are
taken by non-Indian fishermen who are not citizens of
Washington.
In short, even if the Indians' share were
frozen at 50%, it would only amount to about 20% of the
total number of fish in the area. Third, that number
may drop still further when the District Court resolves
the question of hatchery-bred fish which, if the
Puyallup litigation is any guide, may be ·excluded from
the "pie." In fact, that could result in the exclusion
of up to half of the fish in some "runs," as it did in
the Puyallup case. Fourth, the Indians' share is not

-
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frozen at 50%. As footnote 26 indicates, that is a
ceiling, but not a floo~, and the District Court has
alieady dropped the Ind~ans' share below that point
by 10% after its most recent assessment of the Indians'
needs. Accordingly, even if the hatchery-bred fish
are not excluded, the 20%-of-the-total estimate above
is too high.
Finally, I should point out that the
modifications to the decree proposed in the memorandum
significantly alter the manner in which the Indians'
share is to be calculated, so that they will not receive
the benefit of the District Court's exclusion of
reservation-taken, subsistence, and ceremonial fish.
All . in all, therefore, the Indians will probably end
up taking between 15 and ' 20% of the Washington anadromous fish, which seems to me to be quite consistent
with the treaty language and the intent of the parties
to the treaty.

.•.

~

..

I, of course, would be willing to emphasize these
points more adequately than I have yet done if you
think that would be helpful.
Respectfully,

Mr, Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

·.
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Memorandum
To:

Justice Powell

Re:

Washington v. Washington State Ass'n, No. 77-983, et al.
You have asked me to examine these three curve-lined

cases and evaluate the prospect of writing a dissent.

I have

studied Mr. Justice Stevens' memorandum suggesting an opinion
for the Court, have read the four major relevant cases, and have
reread the major briefs.

I have not as yet done any checking of

the record, however, and would of course have to do some more
research before actually drafting a proposed opinion.
1.

Justice Stevens' Opinion

As you know, the basic issue in this case is whether a
series of Indian treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 give to
several Indian tribes in what is now the State of Washington the
right to take a set proportion of the anadromous fisheries in
that state.

By their terms, these treaties reserved to the

Indians the "right of taking fish at usual and accustomed
grounds and stations ••. in common with all citizens of the
Territory."

The question, therefore, is simply what "right of

taking fish •.• in common" meant as used in the treaties.
As we have discussed, much of Justice Stevens'
memorandum is thoroughly satisfactory.

Thus, his description of

~

/

2.
the facts and prior proceedings (pp. 1-14) is excellent, and I
have no quarrel with the treatment of remedies in Section VII
(pp. 31-36).
disagree.~/

It is with Sections IV and V that we may
Section IV argues that "in common with" as used in

the treaties must be read as guaranteeing more than a mere
"right of access."

Instead, Justice Stevens argues that the

right of access was a means for securing the more important
right to take fish.

He concludes that because the shortage of

fish has made access an insufficient protection for the Indians'
right to take fish, the fisheries must be divided up, with some
set percentage set aside for the Indians.

Justice Stevens

argues that the purpose and language of the treaties, as well as
prior decisions of this Court, support his view that more than a
mere right of access was reserved by the Indians in their
treaties.
Having concluded in Section IV that some percentage of
Washington fisheries must be set aside for the Indians, Justice
Stevens in Section V discusses what that percentage ought to be.
He agrees with the lower courts' basic approach:

because the

Indians depended upon fish for their subsistence and were a

*/ Section VI deals with the effect of the 1930 treaty between
the United States and Canada concerning the Fraser River Salmon.
I generally agree that this treaty should have little effect on
the rights of the treaty Indians in this case, once the Court
has determined how the treaty is to be interpreted.

/
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3.
substantial portion of the population in the 1850's when the
treaties were signed, he begins with a 50-50 split and then
makes adjustments to take various factors into account.

Thus,

he would deduct from the Indians' share those fish taken by them
on their reservations, where they have exclusive fishing rights,
and those fish taken for ceremonial purposes.

On the other

hand, Justice Stevens would count against the non-Indian share
all fish taken from identifiable fisheries by non-Indian
Washington State residents fishing outside of the State's
jurisdiction.

The Indians' resulting percentage amounts to

about 45%.
In his memorandum to Justice Stewart of June 1, Justice
Stevens has clarified his position somewhat concerning the
allocation he proposes.

First, he contends that the basic 50%

allocation should pertain only to those fish which pass through
the Indians' traditional fishing grounds, and therefore that the
initial percentage probably is no more than 25% of all the
available fish in Washington.

Furthermore, he speculates that

non-Washington fisheries and rulings concerning hatchery-bred
fish will diminish the Indians' portion to between 15% and 20%.
Finally, he notes that the allocation percentage is only a
maximum, and therefore that insofar as the Indians do not need
all of the fish they could take, they will not be entitled to
the unneeded portion.

..
4.
2.
a.

Discussion

History and Language
The fundamental dispute in this case is whether the

1854-1855 treaties secure to the Indians a right of access only,
or go farther to guarantee them the option to take a certain
proportion of the yearly catch.

As all parties apparently

concede, this was not a burning question at the time the
treaties were negotiated, for neither the Indians nor the whites
at that time anticipated that the population of the territory
would one day outstrip the supply of fish.

And if there were

plenty of fish to go around, mere access to them would be
enough.
Nonetheless, I think there are at least two good
arguments based upon the language of the treaty and the history
surrounding it that generally support limiting the treaty rights
concerning off-reservation fishing to rights of access.

First,

viewed in historical perspective it makes the most sense to
understand the "common" right to be one of access.

The main

purpose of the treaties was to separate the Indians from the
ever-increasing number of settlers by placing the former onto
reservations.

On these reservations, Indians were given

exclusive rights to take fish.

But the negotiators apparently

recognized that the fish obtainable within the confines of the
reservations would be insufficient for the Indians' needs.
Under common law principles in force at the time, settlers who

5.

took title to land along the river banks would hold the
exclusive right to take fish from the river.

Accordingly, to

preserve the Indians' riqhts to take any fish from offreservation locations (indeed, to preserve the right to get to
such locations), the treaty secured the right "to take fish ••• in
common with" residents of the Territory.

Thus viewed, this

right was a right of access--a right to take some fish from off
of the reservation--rather than a right to take a particular
percentage of all the fish.
Second, the language of the treaties, viewed as a whole ,
does not support Justice Stevens' interpretation.
two different fishing rights given to the Indians:

There were
exclusive

rights for fishing on the reservations, and "common" rights for
fishing at usual and accustomed Indian fishing spots off of the
reservations.

Justice Stevens must concede, however, that the

exclusive rights for reservation fishing were rights of access
only, for otherwise the Indians would have the right to take all
of the fish passing through their reservation.

But no

explanation is given for why the common rights should not be
read like the exclusive rights as rights of access only.
Indeed, Justice Stevens' reading of this language makes
little sense.

If the Indians reserved the absolute right to

take half of the fish from locations off of the reservation,
then why was there a special, exclusive right to take fish on
the reservation?

Under the Court's rationale, the Indians can

6.
take only up to 50% of any given fishery, and fish caught on the
reservation apply toward this quota.

But if one has a right to

certain fish--irrespective of their location--it hardly makes
any difference that only that person can fish in a certain area.
Rather, the "exclusive" right makes sense only if the fisheries
were not meant to be apportioned, for then access is crucial.
In order to avoid making the exclusive reservation right a
nullity, therefore, it makes the most sense to interpret the in
"common" right to be, like the exclusive right, one of access
alone.
b.

Prior Decisions
Nor do the cases require the reading Justice Stevens

has given the treaties.

Perhaps the case most directly on point

is United States v. Winans, 198

u.s.

371 (1905).

In that case,

a settler constructed several fish wheels in the Columbia River
at a place where reservation Indians usually fished.

These fish

wheels apparently took from the river virtually every salmon
swimming upstream, thereby giving the settler a monopoly on the
fishery in that river.

The Indians brought an action

challenging the use of the fish wheels, claiming that it
violated their treaty rights to "tak[e] fish at all usual and
accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory."
This Court upheld the Indians, stating that "in the actual
taking of fish white men may not be confined to a spear or crude
net, but it does not follow that they may construct and use a

7.

device which gives them exclusive possession of the fishing
places, as it is admitted a fish wheel does."
(emphasis added).

..!.9...:.,

at 382

Thus, it appears that the primary basis for

the Court's decision was the fact that the use of the fish
wheels interfered with the Indians' right of access.

This

interpretation is confirmed by the opinion of the District
Court, quoted at length in this Court's opinion, which noted
that the operation of the fishing wheels "necessitates the
exclusive possession of the space occupied by the wheels."
at 380.

Id.,

And indeed the Solicitor General's brief in Winans,

referred to approvingly by the Court, advocated only "a way of
access, free ingress and egress to and from the fishing
grounds."

The Court in Winans, therefore, apparently understood

the treaties to secure nothin.g more than a right of access to
the usual Indian fishing places.
Justice Stevens also finds support for his views in the
Puyallup cases, which involved Indian fishing rights under the
1854-1855 treaties.

In Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of

Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (Puyallup I), the Court ruled that
fishing regulations could be imposed upon Indians fishing at
their "usual and accustomed" spots only to the extent necessary
for conservation.

As Justice Stevens suggests, the Court's

decision in Puyallup I indicates that the treaties guaranteed
something more than just "equal access" for the Indians,
inasmuch as non-Indians plainly were subject to regulations not

_t....
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connected with conservation.

Puyallup I does not, however,

undermine an interpretation of the treaties that would give
Indians only a right of access (albeit access greater than that
allowed non-Indians).

As I have suggested, a plausible reading

of the treaties is that Indians were given the right to go to
their usual fishing spots and take some fish from those spots.
This was not because everyone else in the Territory had this
right.

Quite the contrary, the danger the Indians sought to

avoid apparently was that they, like other residents of the
Territory, would be prevented from reaching their usual fishing
spots by those who acquired land along the waterfront.

Thus

understood, Puyallup I stands only for the proposition that the
only restrictions that may be placed upon Indians fishing at one
of their usual and accustomed spots are those restrictions
necessary for conservation purposes.

It certainly does not

suggest that Indians must be guaranteed a certain percentage of
each fishery.
Washington Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S.
44 (1973)(Puyallup

I~),

is somewhat more difficult to explain.

In that case, the Court considered the question whether a ban on
all net fishing for steelhead trout in the Puyallup River
violated the Indian treaties insofar as it kept Indians from
fishing at their usual and accumstomed places by use of nets.
The rule did not run afoul of the Court's decision in Puyallup

lr

inasmuch as it was uncontradicted that, if the Indians were

9
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allowed to use nets and non-Indians were allowed to maintain
their sport fishing rate, the Puyallup River fishery would be
destroyed.

Nonetheless, the Court struck down the state ban on

the Indians' net fishing, finding that, although the rule on its
face did not treat Indians differently from non-Indians, in
effect it discriminated against the Indians "because all Indian
net fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely
pre-empted by non-Indians, is allowed."
(emphasis added).

414 U.S., at 48

Thus, it appears that, for whatever reason,

limiting the Indians to line fishing in the Puyallup River would
have meant that the Indians would have obtained no fish
whatsoever. See ibid., at 46-47 s("The ban on all net fishing in
the Puyallup River for steelhead [trout] grants, in effect the
entire run to the sports fishermen").

Indeed, the Solicitor

General in Puyallup II objected to the ban on net fishing
because "[i]t subordinates the Tribe's rights to those of sports
fishermen and gives the Tribe only what might be left after the
sports fishermen of unlimited number have had their take."
Brief of Respondent in Puyallup II, O.T. 1972, No. 481, p. 18.
The remedy prescribed by the Court in Puyallup II was
an allocation of the Puyallup River salmon among the Indians and
the non-Indians.

The Court declined to make any specific

allocation, however, preferring to leave it up to the District
Court.

On remand, the District Court made a roughly 45-55%

allocation between Indians and non-Indians, repectively.

10 •

Despite the Court's approval of allocation in Puyallup II, it
does not necessarily follow that Indians' common fishing rights
under the treaties generally must take the form of a right to
take a specified percentage of the fisheries passing their
lands.

Rather, under Puyallup II two factors must converge

before an apportionment is necessary:

(1) conservation must

require that limitations be placed upon the amount of fish to be
taken or upon the means by which they are to be taken; and (2)
application of regulations which are neutral on their face must
in fact place upon the Indians an undue portion

~/

of the burden

of the required conservation.
In the present case, I suspect that there is little
doubt but that conservation requires the State of Washington to
place , some limitations upon the methods by which fish may be
cauqht and upon the amount that may be caught.

It is far from

clear, however, that application of neutral regulations (such as
a catch limitation per boat or per fisherman) would impose the
burden of conservation upon the Indians alone.

Indeed, the

*/ In Puyallup II the burden placed upon the Indians was undue
because, as the Solicitor General pointed out, the State
regulation totally subordinated Indian fishing rights to those
of non-Indians. The present cases may require the Court to
decide what short of total subordination amounts to "undue"
burdening of Indian fishing rights. As I understand it, Justice
Stevens would argue that any regulations required by
conservation that do not guarantee to the Indians roughly 50% of
the fish passing their land will necessarily impose the burden
of conservation upon the Indians to too great a degree.

11•

State argues that the fisheries at issue in these cases are
quite different from that at issue in Puyallup II because the
Indians are entitled to fish at the very mouths of the bodies of
water.

Thus, there is no danger that, if the Indians are·

subjected to restrictions similar to those imposed upon nonIndians, there will be too few fish to be caught by the time
they reach the Indians.

Absent this peculiar configuration,

application of even-handed regulations will not discriminate
against the Indians, and therefore apportionment should not be
required under Puyallup II.
Finally, Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433
U.S. 165 (1977)(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in
deciding the issue in the present cases.

The Court in that case

decided only that the regulations permitted in Puyallup I could
be applied against Indian fishing on the reservations, as well
as off of them.
c.

Recommendation
As you see from this memorandum, this case is fairly

complex and the arguments seem to me difficult.

There are two

different ways in which a dissent might be written to Justice
Stevens' proposed opinion.

First, we could challenge his

initial determination that a specific apportionment is required.
Thus, it seems to me that he jumps too quickly to his conclusion
that the treaties--as written and as interpreted by this Court-require an apportionment of fish in every case.

I have

12
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suggested some arguments based on the language and history of
the treaties and this Court's prior decisions why a different
approach may be appropriate.
only real sticking point.

In my view, Puyallup II is the

Nonetheless, on the basis of the

reading I have done heretofore, it seems to me that even that
case may be distinguished.

At the very least it seems that the

appropriate course would be to remand to the District Court for
findings whether the unique conditions present with respect to
the Puyallup River Salmon are present here as well.

Indeed, it

appears that this may be what the State of Washington is asking
for.

See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 30-31.
Alternatively, we could concede that an apportionment

is required and challenge Justice Stevens' 50-50 presumption.
There are at least two reasons for doing so.

First, he assumes

that the right to take fish is one held by the Indians as a
group, rather than a right held by each individual Indian.

But

if the right were for each Indian to take fish in common with
others (Indian and non-Indian), then apportionment should be
made among all those who take fish--not just between the Indians
as a group and the non-Indians as a group.

And this Court in

Winans explicitly indicated that treaty fishing rights "are
reserved .•• to every individual Indian, as though named therein."
198

u.s.,

at 381.

If the apportionment were done on such a per

capita basis, of course, the portion given to the Indians would
be far less than 50%.

Indeed, if the State of Washington's

1 3.

brief is to be believed, such an apportionment would place the
Indians in a worse position than they were before this action
was brought, for it appears that the Indians long have taken
more fish from Washington waters per person than have nonIndians.
Assuming that allocation by group is proper, however,
there still are difficulties with Justice Stevens' position.
The treaties were negotiated with individual tribes--not with
the Indians en masse.

Thus, I can see no good reason for saying

that although "common" means "half," each tribe understood that
the half for which it bargained would be diminished by the
shares of all of the other tribes that entered into treaties
with the non-Indians.
David

rll Following our accidental discussion on •rhursday, I
,, volunteered to relieve Bill Rehnquist of the task of tryin9
to qet somet.hinq. on paper
for us to consider.
.

I send to each of you here with a memorandum
prepared by my clerk, David Westin. In the limited time
available, l think David has done a fine piece of work with I am afraid -little help from me.
r·,

here. The.~
view sev~ral of us expressed at Conference that a 50-50
division of tbe fisb was not acceptable, remains my view .d~'lspite th~ excellence of John • s opinion.
Nor do I think any
mathematical division of the fish is either required by the
treaty or makes a.ny sense. The more difficult question (as
r
we all recognize) is ; who.t docs make sense, consistently with
the treaty?
'
" ~ '
, 'i'he queation now is where do we qo from

l

Subject to further discussion, I am inclined to
agree with the view advanced in the enclosed memorandum that
the language and nistory of the treaty (including its
interpretation in Winan's, 198 u.s. 371), properly requires
that it be construe<! as ·<juaranteeinq only a "riqht of access" ,.
in common. It really mak.es no sense to say that some
,,
specified p~rcentaqe is in effect quaranteed. There is the , >
problem of Puxallue II, althouqh I believe this can be
~
distinguished as suggested by David's memo.
If we were to agr~e that the right is limited to
access in common, the question remains as to exactly bow we
describe the result of that interpretation. 1 suppose we
could, as David Westin suggests as one possibility, remand to
the District Court which is better situated than we are to
work out the details. I have not thought this throuqh yet.

,.,
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 7, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983 -Washington v. Washington State Ass'n

Dear Potter, Byron and Lewis:
I am in general agreement with Lewis' proposal of
June 6th, and with the memorandum of David Westin which he
enclosed with it. I would be willing to see it written out
along those lines, and think any inconsistencies between the
views expressed in the memo and Puyallup II would be no greater
than those between the latter and the treaty itself.
Sincerely,~

' '"'
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Powell
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 7, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983 - Washington v. Washington
State Ass'n

Dear Lewis,
I have read David Westin's memorandum with
interest, and I think he has done a fine job in the
limited time available. Perhaps it would expedite
matters if the four of us could meet to talk this
over after each of us has had a chance to read the
memorandum and collect his thoughts.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
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C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 8, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983 -Washington v. Washington State Ass'n

Dear Lewis:
I would be more than happy to meet with you, Potter,
and Byron, in accordance with the suggestion contained in
Potter's . letter of June 7th, at any mutually convenient time.
Sincerely,

v---

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Mr. Justice Stewart
and Mr. Justice White
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Washington v. United States, No. 78-119
First Draft of Dissentinq Opinion
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.

\
I join parts I-III of the Court's opinion. \ I cannot

I

he Indians traditionally have fished be reserved for their
xclusive use.

On the contrary, the

lanquaqe ~~~

r...e,. and

history of the treaties, as subsequently interpreted by this

\
Court, plainly indicate that the fishing rights reserved by the
I dians were rights of access only.

Accordingly, I dissent.

I

At issue in these cases is the meaninq of

*

oiR~le

fou d in each of the six Indian treaties neqotiated and
siqned in 1854 and 1855.1/

F.ach of the treaties provided

substantially that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and
accustomed qrounds and stations is further secured to said
Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of

~
#1·~
The

2.
question before us is whether this "common" fishing right is a
right

only ~ ~usual

and accustomed fishing

~k

s~~c~ 1~

~)

fish~

or includes the greater riqht to exclude others from

taking a particular portion of the fish that pass throuqh the
sites.

As the Court observes, at the time the treaties were

signed there was no need directly to address this question, for

'"--kJ ~~ a~ .
the surfeit of fish made lack of access the only constraint upon
-1
supply.

Nonetheless, I believe that the fairest inference to be

drawn from the languager

o~~~e, . and

history of the treaties

~

is that the Indians sought and retained only the right to qo to
their accustomed fishing places and there fish along with nonIndians.
,.~

Nothing in the language of the treaties
any party understood that constraints would be placed on the
amount of fish that anyone could take

-

r~ contrary,
-'\

.

the

t > fplain meaning of the languaqe is that non-Indians would be
allowed
(

~~~al

freedom to take fish

4A'~
alQ~ with Indians

in areas where the Indians traditionally had fished.
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371

(1905).

United

This interpretation is

confirmed by the language used in the treaty negotiated with the
Yakima Tribe, which explicitly includes what apparently is
implicit in each of the treaties:

the Indians' right to take

fish on their reservations is exclusive.

Thus, the Yakima

3.
treaty provides that "[t]he exclusive right of takinq fish in
all the streams where running throuqh or borderinq said
reservation, is further secured to said confederated tribes and
bands of Indians, as also the right of takinq fish at all usual
and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
Territory •••• "

12 Stat. 951.

The Court apparently concedes

that this exclusive riqht to take fish does not mean that the
Indians are entitled to all of the fish that would pass their
reservation if left unmolested.

Indeed, the Court would ~

~ reduce the Indian J 50 percent portion by those fish
caught on the reservation.

See

~,

at

But there is no

.

/

reason apparent from the lanquaqe used in the treaties why the
"right of taking fish" means one thing for purposes of the
exclusive riqht of reservation fishing and quite another for
purposes of the "common" right of fishing at usual and
accustomed places.

The most reasonable conclusion, therefore,

is that when the Indians and Governor Stevens agreed upon a
"riqht of taking fish," they understood this riqht to be one of

acces~~ve

access with respect to fishinq places on the

reservation, and common access with respect to fishing places
off of the reservation.3/
In addition to the language

ana

st ~~

of the

treaties, the historical setting in which they were negotiated

4.
supports the inference that the fishing rights secured for the
Indians were rights of access alone.

The primary purpose of the

six treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve
growing disputes between the settlers claiming title to land in
the Washington Territory under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9
Stat. 437, and the Indians who had occupied the land for
generations.

Under the bargain struck in the treaties, the

Indians ceded their claims to vast tracts of land, retaining
only certain specified areas as reservations, where they would
have exclusive rights of possession and use.

In exchange, the

Indian tribes were given substantial sums of money and were
promised various forms of aid.
Creek, 10 Stat. 1132.

See, e.g., Treaty of Medicine ;

/

By thus separating the Indians from the

settlers it was hoped that friction could be minimized.
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that
restricting the Indians to relatively small tracts of land might
interfere with their securing food.

See Letter of George Gibbs

to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the
liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper
season, roots, berries, and fish").

This necessary "liberty of

motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers
whose land abutted--or would abut--the waterways from which fish
traditionally had been caught.

Thus, in Governor Stevens'

5.
report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he noted the
tension between the land rights afforded settlers under the 1850
Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to have some access to
the fisheries.

Although he expressed the view that "[ilt never

could have been the intention of Congress that Indians should be
excluded from their ancient fisheries," he noted that "no
condition to this effect was inserted in the donation act," and
therefore recommended the question "should be set at rest by
law."

Report of Governor Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian

Affairs, App. 327.

Viewed within this

common fishing riqht reserved to

,

1854 and 1855 could only have been the rightAto

rea~

eft QE

~-~

resex:ua-J;.iePJ:s ~ o-r~ ~ rea~ fish at ~ locations
1\

traditionally used by the Indians for this purpose.

On the

other hand, there is no historical indication that either side
to the treaties understood that the Indians would be
specifically guaranteed some set portion of the fisheries to
which they traditio nally had

h aa ~ ac

II
Insofar as prior decisions of this Court speak to the
question of the extent of Indian rights under the treaties\ of

/HA

- c:U_/~t. 1-.A-1
I~
1854 and 1 855, those decisions;_ ee-nfirm tha,t; +el:le---f.H;.hi-n
1

./~

.

J

'

I

~J
',.q.hts l.
~I ""(

~~~ 1~..,-.~~{q
~ ~41\,~orr
. r•• ~t~ ~-&y ~were riqhts of access

e~·---

-

6.

" .
nly.

-_;

Perhaps the case most directly on point is Unifed State~

v; Winans, 198

---

u.s.
-

371

(190.:;_jl~- th~

-- ---

case a settler had

constructed several fish wheels in the Columbia River.

These

fish wheels were built at locations where the Indians
traditionally had fished, and "'necessitate[d] the exclusive
possession of the space occupied by the wheels,'"

Ibid~,

at

380, thereby interferinq with the Indians' treaty right of

access~ ~~urt

reviewed in some detail the precise nature

of the Indians' fishinq rights under the Yakima Treaty, and
concluded that the treaties,

" ••• reserved riqhts ••• to every individual Indian, as
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon
every piece of land as though described therein.
There was an exclusive ~ight of f ishing r eserved
wtihin certain boundari e s. There was a right
outside of those boundaries reserved 'in common with
citizens of the Territory.' As a mer e riqht , it was
not exclusive in the Indians. Ci tizens might share
it, but the Indians were secured in its en j oyment by
a special provision of means for its exercise. They
were given 'the right of takinq fish at all usual
and accustomed places,' and the riqht 'of erecting
temporary buildings for curing them.' The
contingency of the future ownership of the lands,
therefore, was foreseen and provided for--in other
words, the Indians were qiven a riqht in the land-the rignr-of crossino-Tt to the r1ver--the-ri~to
occupy lt to the extenr-and for the purpose
mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to
the treaty."
(Emphasis added.)

r

Winans the Court concluded that this right of access had been

abridged, stating r thaj

"in the actual taking of fish white men

may not be confined to a spear or crude net, but it does not

7.
follow that they may construct and use a device which qives them
exclusive possession of the fishing places, as it is admitted a
fish wheel does."

Id;, at 382 (emphasis added).

Thus, Winans

was decided upon the basis of a treaty-secured right of access
alone.

Moreover, the Court's analysis of the treaty right at

issue in Winans strongly indicates that nothing more than a
right of access

~-rd) fairlyA be

inferred from the treaty·.!/

____...

l Nor

do the Puyallup cases interpret the common fishing

right of the treaty to require an apportionment of Washington
State fisheries. M\

eve-pY 8a&li.

Game of Washington, 391

u.s.

In Puyallup Tribe · v. -Dept. of

392 (1968)(Puyallup I), the Court

~4~S"4~·

.;

ruled that He-l:l~~ regulations A could interfere with the Indi-ails'

~,It:>;;:,'·~,. ~

rightf ~ a~e-Ji.o their "usual and accustomed" fishing spots
only to the extent necessary for conservation.

The Court

observes that this connotes something more than mere "equal
access" for the Indians, inasmuch as non-Indians plainly were
subject to regulations not connected with conservation.
~,at

See

Puyallup I does not, however, indicate that the

treaties should be interpreted as securing anything other than
some form of a right of access.

As noted above, the history and

the language of the accords suggest that the right of taking
fish in common with residents of the Territory was included
within the treaties in order to assure that Indians would be

8.
able to Leav e their reservations and

landsJ

their traditional fishing

owned

~t
s~

fish.

in

Under the Land Donation Act and the common law of property, this
'

~.u,l

. . ?1-Mright was not one shat:'-e.C by G¥-eF-Yl residen t> i-A. "'-the Terri tory.
r'\

1\

. "-- /.r

t

Quite the contrary, the danger the Indians sought to avoid was

r

in part / that they, like others, would be excluded from private

~ rut nt~~ ~

s

land--i"'Fl:--e"'f: E-e-e.G.. ~ t.hos.e settlers who
.1\

1\

the banks of the various waterways would

~

Celll!O

eo own land along
/1

ee~bo

effective monopoly upon the taking of fish.

have an

See supra, at

Thus understood, Puyallup I confirms that the treaties secured

~
1-o~~-- ·. /A
onl ~rightf of access 1 fo~ ~cc e ss greater than that generally
available to residents of the Territory was precisely what
Indians bargained for and received.

~
th~

""'

J

In permitting t he State to place limitations on the
I ndians' access rights when conservation so requires, the Cou r t
went farther in Puyallup I and suggested that even regulations
t h us justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal
p rotection implicit in the phrase 'in common wi t h.'"

391

u.s.,

au,...,J..., 4
a t 40 3 .

Kn Washington · Game Department v. Puyallup · Tribe, 414
A

U • S . 4 4 ( 1 9 7 3 ) ( P u y a 11 up I I) , . . .

~00-l~cif>"'~l-Wii-i~~.s;r.,J.,,! =Ao~--,d ~

considered whether the conservation measures taken by the State
~

Indians.

had been even-handed in the ~ treatment of the

At issue was a Washington State ban on all net

9.
fishing--by both Indians and non-Indians--for steelhead trout in
the Puyallup River.

According to testimony before the trial

court, the annual run of steelhead trout in the Puyallup River
was between 16,000 and 18,000, while unlimited sport fishing
would result in the taking of between 12,000 and 14,000
steelhead annually.

Because at least 25% of the entire run was

required for escapement for hatcheries and spawning, the sport
fishing totally preempted

aJ)(
commercial fishing

~

what ~Q•;er

by

~~Yk.s~~~ ~

claimed that this ban amounted to an improper subordination of

their treaty rights

to[,.....,.~!li.aR.,..

p rivileqe of re creational
1

fishing/~_d)_ 4 ~ '-;'~
We

~ inse~er
.

~

~

in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing,

as it applied to Indians covered by treaty,
)

·~~u-1 ~ ~A./-s,
i~~

M'

wa~
""

e-ff~ 'the State in the name of conservation was

discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely ureempted by non-'-Indians, is allowed."
~~).

414 U.S., at 48 ~emphasis

r

Because "[o]nly an expert could fairly estimate what

degree of net fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow
the escapement of fish necessary for perpetuation of the
species," Ibid., at 48, we remanded to the Washington courts for
a fair apportionment of the steelhead run between Indian net

1 0.

fishing and non-Indian sport fishing.
statements to the contrary, see

in the State

Qf~aBR~A~

and non-Indian fishermen.

~'

1 Despite
at

the Court's

)

, we did not rule in

must be apportioned between Indian
Rather, the question before the Cour

that case was the narrow one whether the State was free to
exhalt methods of

used exclusively by non-Indians over

~

~dian methods _of

once it was determined that some

regulation of fishing was required for purposes of

conservation~

) Having decided that some regulation was required, but that the
treaty forbad the State to choose to regulate only Indian
fishing for conservation purposes, we remanded for an
apportionment between net fishing and sport fishing

~

1--

-------------------~/

Emerging from our decisions inl1Uyailup · r and Puyallup
i\

!!r

therefore, is the proper approach to interpretation of the

Indians' common fishinq rights at the present time, when demand
outstrips supply.

The Indians have the right to qo to their

traditional fishing grounds to fish.

Once there, they cannot be

restricted in their methods or in the size of their take, save
insofar as restrictions are required for t:Re
the fisheries from which they draw.

~ lre e-f

conservinq

Even in situations where

such regulations are required, however, the State must be evenhanded in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing activity.

It

is not free to make the determination--apparently made by
Washington with respect to the ban on net fishing in the
~

Puyallup River--that Indian fishing riqhts will be
subordinated to the interests of non-Indians.
III

-

In the present case, the District Court did not find

particular State fishing regulation to be invalid because it

I restricted impermissibly the Indians' right to take fish at
their usual and accustomed fishinq places.

Rather, after

concluding that Indian fishing off of the reservation properly
was subject to some State regulation in the interests of
conservation, the court immediately considered an

apportionmen~

/

between Indians and non-Indians, noting that "[b]y dictionary
definition ••• 'in common with' means sharing equally."
\ F.Supp., at 343.

384

The court interpreted this equal sharinq to

require that "non-treaty fishermen shall have the opportunity to
take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that may be
taken by all fishermen at usual and accustomed grounds and
stations and treaty right fishermen shall have the opportunity

I

to take up to the same percentage of harvestable fish •••. "
Ibid.
In my view

t
i-'~FeO.f!'lft~eHW,J.:l~~p~r'*i.-E;o~;r;. . .Jc;:::.iaaoslii:e~s.-----ITuoud;).j'ii"~liiCI., j

wet=~

a

~ubstanLial

de~art:ure

11...~~~

n e f f e c t jrt reform 4t( the

struck with the Indians in 1854-1855 to conform with

~perceive
1

as a just result.

a

what~WQ

1 2.

IZIW

Under Puyallup I it is plain

that the State of Washington properly can impose regulations on
Indians as well as non-Indians when it is necessary
~~-~~

so.

r to preserve and protect the fisheries of the State.

n

But

the regulations promulgated for this purpose need not take the
form of a specific apportionment of the harvestable fish between
Indians and non-Indians.

Under our decision in Puyallup II the

Indians' right under the treaties is only to be free even from
conservation-based fishing regulation where it is shown that the
State in structuring its conservation program has chosen to
subordinate the rights of Indian fishermen to those of nonIndians.
~Rt

Here there was no such showing.

On the contrary, from

that appears in the record, the regulations in force at

the time of the District Court's decision were entirely evenhanded. / Nothing more is required by the treaties, save insofar
as access to the fishing places is concerned.
To be sure, the unforeseen circumstances developing in
the last 115

years~

have affected seriously the Indians'

ability to catch fish in the Pacific Northwest.

This is not the

result, however, of State regulation, but rather of chanoes in
the population of the area and in the technology that makes
commercial fishing an attractive business.

To some extent the

13
disadvantages visited upon the Indians from these

finavoidabi~J'

changes may be ameliorated by special federal programs to
modernize the Indians' fishing equipment in order to make them
truly competitive with their non-Indian counterparts.

But this

Court should not undertake to rewrite the treaties of 1854-1855
in order to achieve what it may perceive to have been a just
bargain in retrospect.

I therefore would reverse the judqment

of the Ninth Circuit and remand for consideration whether the
regulations in force before the District Court acted in this
case were based upon the State's decision to subordinate the

Indians' fishing riqhts to those of the

non-Indi~ns ~

0

Footnotes
1.

I

Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point

Elliott, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933;
Treaty with the Makahs, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas,
12 Stat. 951; Treaty of Olympia, 12 Stat. 971.
2.

Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133.

There were some

slight, immaterial variations in the languaqe used.

See,

e~g;,

Treaty with the Yakimas, quoted infra, at
3.

Indeed, if the Court's interpretation of the treaties were

correct, then the exclusive right with respect to reservation
fishing would be largely superfluous.

...'

If the Indians had the
l,

right to 50%, and no more, of the fish irrespective of where
they are caught, then it hardly would be of any great value to
them that they could keep others from taking fish from locations
on the reservation.

The most reasonable way to interpret the

exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value,
therefore, is as a special right of access.
4.

The Government's brief in Winans, cited approvinqly by the

Court in that case, indicates that the Government also
understood the treaty to guarantee nothing more than access
rights to traditional fishing locations.

In that brief, the

'.

Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress and
egress to and from the fishinq qrounds."

Brief for Appellant,

No. 180, O.T. 1904, p. 56.
This interpretation of Winans was
the Court a short time later in Seufert
States, 249

u.s.

194 (1919).

uueqa~ ca!ty

Bros~

affirmed by

Co; v. · united

At issue in that case was whether

Indians from the Yakima nation had the right under their treaty
to cross the Columbia River and fish from the south bank, which
admittedly had belonged to other tribes at the time of the
treaty.

The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestionably

involvinq only the riqht of access, to be squarely controlled by
its earlier decision in Winans.

249

u.s.,

at 198.

Moreover,

•
'

<"

the Court reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation
of common fishing riqhts to the Indians amounted to a servitude.
Ibid., at 199.]
5.

Puyallup Tribe v.

Washinqton · Game · nept~,

433

u.s.

165

(1977)(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in deciding the
issue in the present cases.

The Court in that case decided only

that the regulations permitted in Puyallup · I could be applied
against Indian fishing on the reservations, as well as off of
them.

LFP/lab

Rider A, pg. 1

6/12/79

78-119

u.s.

Wash. v.

I am not in agreement, however, with the Court's conclusion

...

that the treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the
Indians of the Washington Territory require, as a starting

..'

point for determining the fishing rights of Indians and nonIndians, a " 5o-5 ~ division of all fish passing land upon which

I

the Indians traditionally have fished.

··-

,Ante, at 25 et seq.

Court's opinion, as I read
t b\1~ SoiC'Wif'\1\\' .J
~ ~ e tsaw division between the contending parties,

,, .

.;.,

•'

"~

subject to some downward adjustment on the Indians' side.

L~-\rlo4t) t he treaty language to "take fish • • . in common" ~
~ gQ~5tr~9Q to require ~Ri8 ~ The Court apparently views the
treaties as guaranteeing

iA effeee { to the Indians a
,,

specified percentage of the runs of the anadromous fish in
.

question.

1

J

f'\,&.

+r&tiurt

As I do not believe the language and history [can

be construed to support the Court's interpretation, I

.J

....

'(·

'

dissent.

. '

...

..

•'·'

'
:"·

LFP/lab

6/12/79

Rider A, pg. 2

JB-119

In short, they won a right of access to fish.

Wash. v.

u.s.

In addition,

..

the Indians retained the exclusive right to take fish on
their reservations, a right not involved in this litigation.

,.

'·

LFP/lab

6/12/79

Rider B, pg. 2

Quite to the contrary,

~ the

Indians the same right as

78-119

language confers upon non-

;d:-

s

" "

i~

Wash. v. U.S.

conferree upon

areas where the Indians traditionally had fished.
Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).

It

hardly~

,·r-sf

Indian ~ even

U

in

·'

l'

J..'~

__,
S i-4<.&
~

could be argued

that Congress
percentage of

Indians were given no

different right.

'

;;~:,
·..

,.

<.,j•;

.•
...

"·····
"l

. . ,1

.-::1'

~·

..:•.

./

,f

'••.

. ·t:...

··.
...

...

•',

··.·,..
.::...
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LFP/lab

6/12/79

Rider A, pg. 5

78-119

Wash. v.

u.s.

All that the Indians had before non-Indians arrived in the
Territory was the natural right to fish, a right exercised at
identifiable locations.

All that the treaties sensibly could

have provided was the preservation of a right of access to
these locations for the purpose of fishing there in common
with non-Indians who had such access.

.

.

II

Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the
dilution of these treaty rights, but none
issue

~~l, ~ before

us.

~
~

addressed

the

I read these decisionsas

supporting the view expressed above.

T~ is is particularly

true of u.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the case most
directly relevant.

\

LFP/lab

6/12/79

The Court thus

Rider A, pg. 6

78-119

Wash. v.

u.s.

~
~

these treaties as intending to "give[] a

right in the land" - - a "servitude" upon all non-Indian land
! '

- to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the
Territory".

The focus was on access to the traditional

.•,..
~-

I

fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of
fishing".
before

Id., at 380.

it ) ~ '

w~~

The

~ ourt

~

concluded, on the facts

that the right of access to fish in

these areas had been abridged.

It stated that

.

. '
.,..
''.

"

,.

•¥::.. '

.:

![,

.,

.·..,

.

·'.

.·'··,.
)'.,._.

J

'

L

'

..

' ., '
,

..

'··~-

. •'

.f

'•

'

'

,•'
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?

Rider A, pg. 7

78-119

Wash. v.

u.s.

Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for
Indians.

Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of

Washington, 391 U. S. 392 (1968)

(Puyallup I), consistently

with Winans, described the right of Indians under the
treaties as "the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed
plac1 ' ."

Id., at 398.*

The issue before the Court in

Puyallup I was the extent to which the state could regulate
fishing.

v'

It held:
"
• • the 'right' to fish outside the
reservation was a treaty 'right' that could
not be qualified or conditioned by the State.
But 'the time and manner not being defined or
established by the treaty, were within the
reach of state power."
Id. at 399.

.

'

*The treaty right was
Puyallup I as a "right to

~

fish~

referred to in

This term was used no less

in the course of the opinion, with
distinction being made between the right "to fish"

~ take

fish".

'1

Id., at 391 -99.

~
ana ~ o

,.

LFP/lab

6/12/79

Rider }\, pg. 7

78-119

..

Wash. v. U.S.

,-

The Court today finds support for its views in
Puyallup I because the Court there recognized that apart from
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians.

It does not

follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties.

)

The

.,

..
'·'

Court misappreciates the nature of the basic right sought to
be preserved by Congress.

This, as noted above, was a right

of access by Indians to their usual and accustomed fishing
areas - a right to reach these areas - described in Winans as
a servitude or right over land not owned by Indians.

Putting

it differently, this is a right to trespass on any land when

....

...

;.,

necessary to reach the traditional fishing areas, and is a
...

'.

right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the Territory or
such residents following statehood.

.'
\

".

...

<

~·

••

,.

\.

'.

'
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u.s.

Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to
"apportionmentl

the Court expansively reads the decision in

that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that~ ~~

f~ht!!!"Ne~ at Indians' "accustomed" fishing sites in the ~tate
must be apportioned between Indian and non-Indian fishermen.
This view certainly is not a necessary reading of
Puyallup II.

Indeed, I view it as a quite unjustified

extension of that case.
narrow question:

Puyallup II addressed an extremely

whether there had been "discrimination" by

state regulations under which "all Indian net fishing

[was]

barred and only hook and line fishing entirely pre-empted by

non-Indians~ lowed."

Id., at 48.

The entire opinion of

the Court is confined to less than five pages of the U.

.,

s.

Reports, and Mr. Justice Douglas stated at the outset that
~

the issue of "allocating the catch" was mentioned "only to
reserve decision on it".

Id., at 48.

In any event, to the

extent language in Puyallup II may be read as supporting some
general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum that is
plainly incompatible with the language and historical
understanding of these treaties.

'•
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Wash. v.

...
In my view, the district court below - and now this
Court - has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot
be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or
indeed with the prior decision of this Court.

It has been

argued to us that the application of this doctrine, and
specificially the construction of the term "in common" as
requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, will result in an
extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fisherman in the
commercial fish market.

'·'·
I

This is said to give them a

·•

substantial position in the market wholly protected from
competition from non-Indian fishermen.

·'

\.

Apparently, non-

.

"

...

"

., ...

··r
'
I

Indian fishermen would be required from time to time to stay
off fishery areas completely while Indians catch their Courtdecreed allotment.

....'t !·
~.

;::::_?·
•' .,.
........

In sum, it is urged that the district
.=

court's decision, if affirmed in substance by this Court,
will discriminate quite unfairly against non-Indians.

I find

it difficult to reject these arguments as being unfounded.

',,

.. ..

.

~:

.. ..
.....

,
~

To be sure, if the treaties must be construed to

'.

produce such a result, it would be our duty so to construe
them.

For the reasons stated above, I think the Court's

construction virtually ignores the historical setting and
...;.

...

purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear

.:-,.. ~.
~,

compellingly upon a proper reading of their language.

Nor do

'

..
''

•..

2.

the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what
seems to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain
struck with the Indians in 1854-1855.
I would hold that the treaties gave to the Indians
two significant rights that should be respected:

as made

clear in Winans, the clear intention of the treaties was to
assure to Indians the right of access over private lands so
that they could continue to fish at their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds.

See also Seufert Bros. Co. v.
{

United States, 249 U.S. 194

).

,

As subsequently

construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen.

Moreover,
<

Indians have the exclusive right to fish on their
reservations, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their
ceremonial and subsistence needs.

!!r

Finally, under Puyallup

.... :

it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation

regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate
against Indian fishermen.
The foregoing package of rights, privileges and
exemptions - possessed only by
substantial.

~Indians

- is quite

I find no basis for according additional

advantages to Indian fishermen.

..-.
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I am not in agreement, however, with the Court's conclusion
that the treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the
Indians of the Washington Territory require, as a starting

·'

'

point for determining the fishing rights of Indians and nonIndians, a 50-50 division of all fish passing land upon which
the Indians traditionally have fished.

''

'

'•·

Ante, at 25 et seq.

The Court's opinion, as I read it, accepts the District
··'

Court's "50-50" division between the contending parties,
subject to some downward adjustment on the Indians' side.
The treaty language to "take fish • • • in common" is
construed to require this.

The Court apparently views the

treaties as guaranteeing - in effect - to the Indians a
specified percentage of the runs of the anadromous fish in

·:'·<

•

,,
,.
....

··:f
'!,
.

question.

As I do not believe the language and history can

;,

be construed to support the Court's interpretation, I
dissent.

.....

~~

.(

)'.

.1~'

.

.;:

....

,.

'\ .., I

\•.
·~
·.~~

' '
,....
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In short, they won a right of access to fish.

Wash. v.

u.s.

In addition,

the Indians retained the exclusive right to take fish on
their reservations, a right not involved in this litigation.

'•
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.,..

Quite to the contrary, as the language confers upon nonIndians the same right as is conferred upon Indians even in
areas where the Indians traditionally had fished.
Winans, 198

u.s.

371 (1905).

u.

S. v.

It hardly even could be arqued

that Congress intended to guarantee non-Indians any specified
percentage of the fish taken, and Indians were given no

.

..

'

different riqht.

'•·'

,t"

..

~

'.

.

•'('
...
I

'

~

:~

.. .

!'

.
'•

"

4. ·•.

·····-

f·

·.
,.
-·:~

,,
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All that the Indians had before non-Indians arrived in the
Territory was the natural right to fish, a right exercised at
identifiable locations.

.•

I

All that the treaties sensibly could

have provided was the preservation of a right of access to
these locations for the purpose of fishing there in common

·.

with non-Indians who had such access.
II

Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the
dilution of these treaty rights, but none have addressed the
issue presently before us.
supporting the view
true of

u.

I read these decisionsas

ex~ressed

S. v. Winans, 198

above.

u.s.

371

THis is particularly
(1905), the case most

directly relevant.

..

.

'
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u.s.

.

~

.·

The Court thus read these treaties as intending to "give[] a

..

right in the land" - - a "servitude" upon all non-Indian land
.... '

- to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the
Territory".

The focus was on access to the traditional
' ..

fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of
fishing".

t

.

',.

Id., at 380.

The Court concluded, on t.he facts

'

before it in Winans, that the right Qf access to fish in
these areas had been abridged.

'

:
'•·

It stated that

..•,·
.

,
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,,\..

f.·

.

.,..

"·J.
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•

....
t

~
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~~·

'
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Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for
Indians.

Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of

Washington, 391 U.

s.

392 {1968) {Puyallup I), consistently

.'

<•

'·

• ..,1

with Winans, described the riqht of Indians under the
treaties as "the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed
placed'."

Id., at 398.*

The issue before the Court in

Puyallup I was the extent to which the state could regulate
fishing.

,

It he l d:

. '

" •• the 'right' to fish outside the
reservation was a treaty 'right' that could
not be qualified or conditioned by the State.
But 'the time and manner not being defined or
established by the treaty, were within the
reach of state power."
Id. at 399.

'

j.

.,

··."' ,.

'

'·-

. r'

*The treaty right was repetitively referred to in
Puyallup I as a "right to fish".

This term was used no less

than five times in the course of the opinion, with no
distinction being made between the right "to fish" and to
"take fish".

Id., at 398-99.

,.
.'· :..
~

..

f
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u.s.

The Court today finds support for its views in
Puyallup I because the Court there recognized that apart from
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians.

It does not

follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties.

The

Court misappreciates the nature of the basic right sought to
be preserved by Congress.

This, as noted above, was a right

of access by Indians to their usual and accustomed fishing
areas - a right to reach these areas - described in Winans as
a servitude or right over land not owned by Indians.

Putting
'

•''

it differently, this is a right to trespass on any land when
necessary to reach the traditional fishing areas, and is a
right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the Territory or
such residents following statehood.

,•
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Wash. v.

u.s.

;..',~_.

j

'

Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to
"apportionment", the Court expansively reads the decision in
.. , ...

that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that all

_

fisheries at Indians'

...,..
.»/.''·'

11

accustomed" fishing sites in the state

must be apportioned between Indian and non-Indian fishermen.

.!

This view certainly is not a necessary reading of
Puyallup II.

Indeed, I view it as a quite unjustified

extension of that case.
narrow question:

Puyallup II addressed an extremely

whether there had been

11

discrimination" by

·..

state regulations under which "all Indian net fishing [was]

. '

barred and only hook and line fishing entirely pre-empted by

...\, .

non-Indians, is allowed."

Id., at 48.

The entire opinion of

the Court is confined to less than five pages of the U.

s.

Reports, and Mr. Justice Douglas stated at th e outse t that
the issue of "allocating the catch" was mentioned "only to
reserve decision on it".

Id., at 48.

In any event, to the

extent language in Puyallup II may be read as supporting some

''

general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum that is
plainly incompatible with the language and historical
understanding of these treaties.
......
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Wash. v.

In my view, the district court below - and now this
Court - has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot
be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or
indeed with the prior decision of this Court.

It has been

,.

argued to us that the application of this doctrine, and
specificially the construction of the term "in common" as
requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, will result in an
extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fisherman in the
commercial fish market.

This is said to give them a

substantial position in the market wholly protected from
competition from non-Indian fishermen.

Apparently, non-

Indian fishermen would be required from time to time to stay

.

·'

off fishery areas completely while Indians catch their Courtdecreed allotment.

In sum, it is urged that the district

court's decision, if affirmed in substance by this Court,
will discriminate quite unfairly against non-Indians.

I find

it difficult to reject these arguments as being unfounded.
To be sure, if the treaties must be construed to
produce such a result, it would be our duty so to construe

..
h

them.

For the reasons stated above, I think the Court's

construction virtually ignores the historical setting and
'

purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear
compellingly upon a proper reading of their language.

Nor do

' '

:

..

·..

)'_.,,.

'.

2.

the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what

... .. ,,.

'

•...,.

'l

,,.. .•.
~;_

seems to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain
struck with the Indians in 1854-1855.

"~"'lol'.

..

I would hold that the treaties gave to the Indians

..

'

-:

two significant rights that should be respected:

as made

, '·.....

'

clear in Winans, the clear intention of the treaties was to
assure to Indians the right of access over private lands so
that they could continue to fish at their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds.

See also Seufert Bros. Co. v.

United States, 249 U.S. 194

).

..

As subsequently

construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen.

'' '

Moreover,

Indians have the exclusive riqht to fish on their
reservations, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their
ceremonial and subsistence needs.

Finally, under Puyallup

!!r it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation
regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate

.

'

against Indian fishermen.
The foregoing package of rights, privileges and
exemptions - possessed only by non-Indians - is quite
substantial.

I find no basis for according additional

.;.·..•

r

advantages to Indian fishermen.

I '

,··

..;·,•

•'

.....

Potte , Byron
' !!: ...

After a further rather careful examination of
central issue in ,,1this case'· I~· have concluded tha.~"~,..t.J:l~e, ~" ~...·
treaties gave the ~ Indians.~a right of access over the lands of
non-Indians to fish (to talt'e fish if they could catch them)
· t their accustomed places'!~l._."'
·

.
he
'"

,,-

~

~

, ·Co:_-.+:-. ,\fl>

.

,iiJ,;;\.1

1

~

enclo;s ed draft of a';"dfssent incorporates' my
present v ews. As the draft is wr.ittf~n~ as a dissent (which
am prepared to c~rculate), it would require substantial
additional writing to convert it into a Court opinion - even
in the unlikely event that four others aqreed with my view of
the treat ieat •, Indeed, as one of you said on Monday:, 1 t well be too ' late for any proper Court opinion othe~ than
•• ''lt.W
John 1 s.
, ~·&i~.

...,

.'.
any comments on
'·'

...'.
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Washington v. United States, No. 78-119
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join parts I-III of the Court's opinion.

I am not in

agreement, however, with the Court's interpretation of the
treaties negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the Indians of the
Washington Territory.

The Court's opinion, as I read it,

construes the treaties' provision "to take fish .•. in common" as
guaranteeing the Indians a specified percentage of the runs of
the anadromous fish passing land upon which the Indians
traditionally have fished.

Indeed, it takes as a starting point

for determining fishing rights an equal division of these fish
between Indians and non-Indians.

~,

at 25, et seq.

As I do

not believe that the language and history of the treaties can be
construed to support the Court's interpretation, I dissent.
I
At issue in these cases is the meaning of language

. ·"

.;

found in six similar Indian treaties negotiated and signed in
1854 and 1855.1/

Each of the treaties provides substantially

that "[t]he right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians, in
common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting
temporary houses for the purpose of

curing."~/

The question

before us is whether this "common" fishing right is a right only

2.
of access to usual and accustomed fishing sites for the purpose
of fishing there, or includes the greater right to exclude
others from taking a particular portion of the fish that pass
through the sites.

As the Court observes, at the time the

treaties were signed there was no need directly to address this
question, for the surfeit of fish made lack of access to fishing
areas the only constraint upon supply.

Nonetheless, I believe

that the compelling inference to be drawn from the language and
history of the treaties is that the Indians sought and retained
only the right to go to their accustomed fishing places and
there to fish along with non-Indians.

In addition, the Indians

retained the exclusive right to take fish on their reservations,
a right not involved in this litigation.

In short, they have a

right of access to fish.
Nothing in the language of the treaties indicates that
any party understood that constraints would be placed on the
amount of fish that anyone could take, or that the Indians would
be guaranteed a percentage of the catch.

Quite to the contrary,

the language confers upon non-Indians precisely the same right
to fish that it confers upon Indians, even in those areas where
the Indians traditionally had fished.
198

u.s.

371 (1905).

United States v. Winans,

As it cannot be argued that Congress

intended to guarantee non-Indians any specified percentage of
the available fish, there is neither force nor logic to the
argument that the same language--the "right to take fish"--does
guarantee such a percentage to Indians.

3.
This conclusion is confirmed by the language used in
the treaty negotiated with the Yakima Tribe, which explicitly
includes what apparently is implicit in each of the treaties:
the Indians'
exclusive.

right to take fish on their reservations is
Thus, the Yakima treaty provides that "[t]he

exclusive right of taking fish in all the streams ·where running
through or bordering said reservation, is further secured to
said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with citizens of the Territory ••.. "
at

12 Stat. 951.

See ante,

There is no reason apparent from the language used in

the treaties why the "right of taking fish" should mean one
thing for purposes of the exclusive right of reservation fishing
and quite another for purposes of the "common" right of fishing
at usual and accustomed places.

Since the Court interprets the

right of taking fish in common to be an entitlement to half of
the entire catch taken from fisheries passing the Indians'
traditional fishing grounds, it

therefo~e

should follow that the

Court would interpret the exclusive right of taking fish to be
an entitlement to all of the fish taken from fisheries passing
the Indians' reservations.

But the Court apparently concedes

that this exclusive right is not of such draconian proportions.
Indeed, the Court would reduce the Indians' 50 percent portion
by those fish caught on the reservation. The more reasonable
conqlusion, therefore, is that when the Indians and Governor

4.

Stevens agreed upon a "right of taking fish," they understood
this right to be one of access to fish--exclusive access with
respect to fishing places on the reservation, and common access
with respect to fishing places off of the reservation.)/
In addition to the language of the treaties, the
historical setting in which they were negotiated supports the
inference that the fishing rights secured for the Indians were
rights of access alone.

The primary purpose of the six treaties

negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve growing disputes
between the settlers claiming title to land in the Washington
Territory under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 437, and
the Indians who had occupied the land for generations.

Under

the bargain struck in the treaties, the Indians ceded their
claims to vast tracts of land, retaining only

ce~tain

specified

areas as reservations, where they would have exclusive rights of
possession and use.

In exchange, the Indian tribes were given

substantial sums of money and were promised various forms of
aid.

See,~,

Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132.

By

thus separating the Indians from the settlers it was hoped that
friction could be minimized.
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that
restricting the Indians to relatively small tracts of land might
interfere wiih their securing food.

See Letter of George Gibbs

to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the
liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper

5.
season, roots, berries, and fish").

This necessary "liberty of

motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers
whose land abutted--or would abut--the waterways from which fish
traditionally had been caught.

Thus, in Governor Stevens'

report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he noted the
tension between the land rights afforded settlers ·under the 1850
Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to have some access to
the fisheries.

Although he expressed the view that "[i]t never

could have been the intention of Congress that Indians should be
excluded from their ancient fisheries," he noted that "no
condition to this effect was inserted in the donation act," and
therefore recommended the question "should be set at rest by
law."

Report of Governor Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian

Affairs, App. 327.

Viewed within this historical context, the

common fishing right reserved to the Indians by the treaties of
1854 and 1855 could only have been the right, over and above
their exclusive fishing right on their reservations, to roam off
of the reservations in order to reach fish at the locations
traditionally used by the Indians for this purpose.

On the

other hand, there is no historical indication that any of the
parties to the treaties understood that the Indians would be
specifically guaranteed some set portion of the fisheries to
which they traditionally had had access.

6.
II
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the
dilution of these treaty rights, but none has addressed the
issue now before us.

I read these decisions as supporting the

interpretation set forth above.
United States v. Winans, 198
directly relevant.

u.s.

This is particularly true of
371

(1905),· the case most

In that case a settler had constructed

several fish wheels in the Columbia River.

These fish wheels

were built at locations where the Indians traditionally had
fished, and "'necessitate[d] the exclusive possession of the
space occupied by the wheels,'"

id., at 380, thereby

interfering with the Indians' treaty right of access to fish.
This Court reviewed in some detail the precise nature of the
Indians' fishing rights under the Yakima Treaty, and concluded
that the treaties,

" ••• reserved rights ••. to every individual Indian, as
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon
every piece of land as though described therein.
·'
There was an exclusive right of fishing reserved
wtihin certain boundaries.
There was a right
outside of those boundaries reserved 'in common with
citizens of the Territory.'
As a mere right, it was
not exclusive in the Indians.
Citizens might share
it, but the Indians were secured in its enjoyment by
a special provision of means for its exercise.
They
were given 'the right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places,' and the right 'of erecting
temporary buildings for curing them.'
The
contingency of the future ownership of the lands,
therefore, was foreseen and provided for--in other
words, the Indian~ were given a right in the land-the rig~o£ crossing-It !£ the r1ver--the-rignr-to

7.
occupy it to the extent and for the purpose
mentioned. No other conclusion would give effect to
the treaty." ~, at 381 (Emphasis added).

The Court thus viewed these treaties as intended to
"giv[e] a right in the land"--a "servitude" upon all non-Indian
land--to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of the
Territory."

The focus was on access to the traditional fishing

areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of fishing."
at 380.

Id.,

The Winans Court concluded, on the facts before it,

that the right of access to fish in these areas had been
abridged.

It stated that "in the actual taking of fish white

men may not be confined to a spear or crude net, but it does not
follow that they may construct and use a device which gives them
exclusive possession of
fish wheel does."

~

fishing places, as it is admitted a

Id., at 382 (emphasis added).

Thus, Winans

was decided solely upon the basis of a treaty-secured right of
access to fish.

Moreqver, the Court's analysis of the treaty

right at issue in Winans strongly indicates that nothing more
than a right of access fairly could be inferred from the
treaty._!/
Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to
require that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved
for Indians.

Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of

Washington, 391 U.S. 392 (1968)(Puyallup I), consistently with
Winans, described the right of Indians under the treaties as
"the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed places.'"

Id.,

8.

at

398.~/

The issue before the Court in Puyallup I was the

extent to which the state could regulate fishing.

It held that,

" ... the 'right' to fish outside the reservation was
a treaty 'right' that could not be qualified or
conditioned by the State. But 'the time and manner
of fishing ••• necessary for the co"nservation of
fish,' not being defined or established by the
treaty, were within the reach of state power."

The Court today finds support for its views in Puyallup
I because the Court there recognized that, apart from
conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive
regulations on the treaty rights of Indians.

But it does not

follow from this that an affirmative right to a specified
percentage of the catch is guaranteed by the

tre~ties

to Indians

or to non-Indians, for the Court misapprehends the nature of the
basic right sought to be preserved by Congress.

This, as noted

above, was a right of the Indians to reach their usual and
accustomed fishing areas.

Put differently, this right,

described in Winans as a servitude or right over land not owned
by the Indians, entitles the Indians to trespass on any land
when necessary to reach their traditional fishing areas, and is
a right not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the area.
In permitting the State to place limitations on the
Indians' access rights when conservation so requires, the Court
went farther in Puyallup I and suggested that even regulations

9.

thus justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal
protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with.'"
at 403.

391

u.s.,

Accordingly, in Washington Game Department v. Puyallup

Tribe, 414

u.s.

44 (1973)(Puyallup II), we considered whether

the conservation measures taken by the State had been evenhanded in the treatment of the Indians.

At issue ·was a

Washington State ban on all net fishing--by both Indians and
non-Indians--for steelhead trout in the Puyallup River.
According to testimony before the trial court, the annual run of
steelhead trout in the Puyallup River was between 16,000 and
18,000, while unlimited sport fishing would result in the taking
of between 12,000 and 14,000 steelhead annually.

Because the

escape of at least 25% of the entire run was required for
hatcheries and spawning, the sport fishing totally preempted
commercial fishing by Indians.
ban on all net fishing.

al~

The State therefore imposed a

The Indians claimed that this ban

amounted to an improper subordination of their treaty rights to
the privilege of recreational fishing enjoyed by non-Indians.
,

We held in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing, as
it applied to Indians covered by treaty, was an infringement of
their rights.

The State in the name of conservation was

discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely preempted by non-Indians, is allowed."

414

u.s.,

at 48.

Bedause

"[olnly an expert could fairly estimate what degree of net

~I"

10 •

fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow the escapement
of fish necessary for perpetuation of the species," Id., at 48,
we remanded to the Washington courts for a fair apportionment of
the steelhead run between Indian net fishing and non-Indian
sport fishing.
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to
"apportionment," the Court expansively reads the decision in
that case as strongly implying, if not holding, that the catch
at Indians'

"accustomed" fishing sites must be apportioned

between Indian and non-Indian fishermen.
not a necessary reading of Puyallup II.

This view certainly is
Indeed, I view it as a

quite unjustified extension of that case.
an extremely narrow question:

whether there had been

"discrimination" by state regulations under
net fishing

Puyallup II addressed

whic~

"all Indian

[was] barred and only hook and line fishing entirely

pre-empted by non-Indians,

[was] allowed."

Id., at 48.

In any

event, to the extent language in Puyallup II may be read as
supporting some general apportionment of the catch, it is dictum
that is plainly incompatible with the language and historical
understanding of these treaties.i/
Emerging from our decisions in Winans, Puyallup I and
Puyallup II, therefore, is the proper approach to interpretation
of the Indians' common fishing rights at the present time, when
demand outstrips supply.

The Indians have the right to go to

their traditional fishing grounds to fish.

Once there, they

11.

cannot be restricted in their methods or in the size of their
take, save insofar as restrictions are required for conserving
the fisheries from which they draw.

Even in situations where

such regulations are required, however, the State must be evenhanded in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing activity.

It

is not free to make the determination--apparently made by
Washington with respect to the ban on net fishing in the
Puyallup River--that Indian fishing rights will be totally
subordinated to the interests of non-Indians.
III
In my view, the District Court below--and now this
Court--has formulated an apportionment doctrine that cannot be
squared with the language or history of the treaties, or indeed
with the prior decisions of this Court.

The application of this

doctrine, and particularly the construction of the term "in
common" as requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment, is likely to
result in an extraordinary economic windfall to Indian fishermen
in the commercial fish market by giving them a substantial
position in the market wholly protected from competition from
non-Indian fishermen.

Indeed, non-Indian fishermen apparently

will be required from time to time to stay out of fishing areas
completely while Indians catch their Court-decreed allotment.
In sum, the District Court's decision will discriminate quite
unfairly against non-Indians.

12 •
To be sure, if it were necessary to construe the
treaties to produce these results, it would be our duty so to
construe them.

But for the reasons stated above, I think the

Court's construction virtually ignores the historical setting
and purpose of the treaties, considerations that bear
compellingly upon a proper reading of their language.

Nor do

the prior decisions of this Court support or justify what seems
to me to be a substantial reformation of the bargain struck with
the Indians in 1854-1855.
I would hold that the treaties give to the Indians two
significant rights that should be respected.

As made clear in

Winans, the purpose of the treaties was to assure to Indians the
right of access over private lands so that they could continue
to fish at their usual and accustomed fishing grounds.

Indians

also have the exclusive right to fish on their reservations, and
are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their ceremonial and
subsistence needs.

Moreover, as subsequently construed, the

treaties exempt Indians from state regulation (including the
payment of license fees) except that necessary for conservation
in the interest of all fishermen.

Finally, under Puyallup ,II,

it is settled that even a facially neutral conservation
regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate against
Indian fishermen.

This package of rights, privileges, and

exemptions--possessed only by Indians--is quite

substanti~l.

find no basis for according them additional advantages.

I

Footnotes
1.

Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point

Elliott, 12 Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933;
Treaty with the Makahs, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas,
12 Stat. 951; Treaty of Olympia, 12 Stat. 971.
2.

Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133.

There were some

slight, immaterial variations in the language used.

See, e.g.,

Treaty with the Yakimas, quoted infra, at
3.

Indeed, if the Court's interpretation of the treaties were

correct, then the exclusive right with respect to reservation
fishing would be largely superfluous.

If the Indians had the

right to 50%, and no more, of the fish irrespective of where
they are caught, then it hardly would be of any great value to
.them that they could keep others from taking fish from locations
on the reservation.

The most reasonable way to interpret the

exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value,
therefore, is as a special right of access.
4.

The Government's brief in Winans, cited approvingly by the

Court in that case, indicates that the Government also
understood the treaty to guarantee nothing more than access
rights to traditional fishing locations.

In that brief, the

Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress and
egress to and from the fishing grounds."
No. . 1 8 0 , 0. T. 1 9 0 4, p. 56.

Brief for Appellant,

This interpretation of Winans was unequivocally affirmed by
the Court a short time later in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United
States, 249

u.s.

194 (1919).

At issue in that case was whether

Indians from the Yakima nation had the right under their treaty
to cross the Columbia River and fish from the south bank, which
admittedly had belonged to other tribes at the time of the
treaty.

The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestionably

involving only the right of access, to be squarely controlled by
its earlier decision in Winans.

249 U.S., at 198.

Moreover,

the Court reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation
of common fishing rights to the Indians amounted to a servitude.
Ibid., at 199.
5.

The treaty right was repeatedly referred to in Puyallup I as

a "right to fish."

This phrase was used no less than seven

times in the course of the opinion, with no distinction being
made between the right "to fish" and the right "to take fish."
Id., at 397-99.
6.

Having decided that some regulation was required, but

t~at

the treaty forbad the State to choose to regulate only Indian
fishing for conservation purposes, we remanded for an
apportionment between net fishing and sport fishing.
Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433

u.s.

Puyallup

165 (1977)(Puyallup

!£!), is of little assistance in deciding the issue in the
present cases.

The Court in that case decided only that the

regulations permitted in Puyaliup I could be applied against
Indian fishing on the

res~rvations,

as well as off of them.
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CHAMBERS 0""

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

June 14, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983, Washington v. United States

Dear Lewis,
I congratulate you and your law clerks on a
very good job done in a very short time. If what you
have written remains a dissenting opinion, I shall
gladly join it. If, on the other hand, it commands
the support of a majority, I see no practical alternative except to set these cases for reargument.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

~JtFtntt Qj:quri l1f tlrt

'Jnittb ~fattg

-uJringhm. ~. <!):. 2ll~~'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

/

June 14, 1979

Re:

No. 77-983 -Washington v. United States

Dear Lewis:
My sentiments with respect to your most recent draft
in this case are the same as those conveyed to you by Potter
in his letter of June 14th. I am firmly of the view that
John's memorandum misconstrues the treaty7 the question of
reargument would depend upon the amount of work which would
inevitably fall on you and your chambers in converting what
is now a dissent into a majority opinion if it attracts four
votes other than yours. It will certainly have mine.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Mr. Justice Stewart
and Mr. Justice White

';j,

-

.,

June 15,

John:
·'Thank you for your letter concerning my dissenting
opinion in these cases. I agree that Puyallup II is a point
of difference between us, although I think that the language
and history of the treaties are controlling.
The opinion for the Court in Pu*allup II is a scant
four pages in length and is so cryptic t at it is difficult
to tell exactly what was being decided or why. Nonetheless,
I think that the most sensible interpretation of Justice
Douglas' opinion does not in any way require that the federai
courts allocate all of the fish subject to the 1854-1855
treaties between the Indians and the non-Indians. Puyallup
II involved the State's ban on net fishing for steelhead
trout in one river (the Puyallup), a regulation
unquestionably justified by conservation requirements
described in Puyallup I. The only question presented and
considered was whether this ban was invalid because it
violated the "equal protection (requirement] implicit in the
phrase 'in common with.'" Puyallup I, 391 u.s., at 403.
Although the ban was neutral on its face, as applied it
discriminated against the Indians, because members of the
Puyallup Tribe engaged in fishing only by means of nets.
Thus, when the Washington Supreme Court ruled that net
fishing would be ~!lowed only if hook-and-line fishing did
not take all of the permissibly harvestable fish, the
Solicitor ~eneral concluded that this would nsubordinat[e}
the Tribe's riqhts to those of sports fishermen and giv[e]
the Tribe only what might be left after the sports fishermen
of unlimited number have had their take." Brief of
Respondent in Puyallup II, O.T. 1972, No. 481, p.18. In sum,
it appears that under tfie special circumstances of the
Puyallup River, preferring hook-and-line fishing to net

..
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fishing in effect preferred non-Indian fishing to Indian
fishing.
It is plain · from the opinion that the Court
understood the issue in Puyallup II to be whether the
treaties would permit the State to meet conservation goals by
means of regulations that would burden only Indian fishermen,
and therefore operate discriminatorily. Writing for the
Court, ..Justice Doug las stated that "[w] hether [the ban on all
net fishing in the Puyallup River] .- amounts to discrimination
under the Treaty is the central issue in these cases." Id., .
at 47. In its brief analysis, the Court observed that "Ttfhe .
ban on all net fishing in thi Puyallup River for steelhead
(trout] grants, in effect the entire run to the sports
fishermen," id., at 46-47, and that the ban discriminated
against the Indians "because all Indian net fishing is barred
and only hook-and-line fishing entirely pre-empted by nonIndians, is allowed." Id., at 48 (emphasis added).------

-

...,t

¥
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-

I believe the correct interpretation of Puyallup II,
therefore, is that it forbad the State of Washington to adopt
otherwise valid conservation restrictions upon Indian fishing
if those restrictions . would have the effect of placing the
entire cost of conservation on the Indians. To be sure, as
you suggest, the Indians in Puyallup II could have begun
hook-and-line fishing in order to continue to take fish in
the Puyallup River. , But the Court in effect ruled that the
"equal protection" aspect of the treaties would be violated
if the Indians alone were made to alter their methods of
taking fish. It was in this' quite limited and unusual
context that the C6urt suggested apportionment as the method
by which Indian fishfng rights could best be secured in the
Puyallup River. The opinion does not suggest ~ that
apportionment is the Indians' right with respect to all of
the fish covered by the treaties in the State of Washington.
.
In sum, I understand Puyallup II to require evenhanded treatment of the Indians whenever some limitation on
their catch is required by conservation concerns. Whether
this "equal protection" interpretation of the treaties is
appropriate, and if so whether it applies to all fisheries
covered by the treaties--or indeed whether it applies
anywhere in the absence of discriminatory effect, are
questions we may have to address at some point in the future.

...

.
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But these questi6ns are
before us in this case, at
in the focused sense in whirih the single issue of
discrimination was presented in Puyallup I I .

·.

Sincerely,
'•
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 15, 1979

RE:

77-983, 78-119 and 78-139 - Washington v. Fishing
Vessel Association

Dear Lewis:
Because your "dissenting" opinion probably has as
good a chance of becoming a Court opinion as my memorandum, it may be appropriate for me to respond by letter
rather than by circulating revisions in my earlier draft.
I think it is imperative that we focus on the proper
interpretation of Puyallup II.
In that case, there was nothing about the state
regulation that entirely preempted the supply of
steelhead for non-Indians;
as the State vigorously
argued in that case, Indians and non-Indians were
afforded equal "access" to the hook-and-line fishery
authorized by the regulation.
Instead, the preemption
found by the Court was the consequence of the fact that
non-Indians so thoroughly outnumbered Indians that
"equal access" effectively prevented the latter from
taking any appreciable number of fish.
By finding that
preemption inconsistent with the treaties, the Cour_t___
rather clearly held that the Indians not only have a right
of "access" to fishing areas but also have a "right Of
taking" a substantial number of fish.
Accordingly, if the treaties merely gave the Indians
the two rights you describe in the last paragraph of your
opinion, Puyallup II should have been decided the other
way.
For the state regulation was not merely "facially

- 2 neutral," but it was also substantively neutral because
it banned commercial, and allowed hook-and-line, fishing
by both non-Indians and Indians.
As I read your opinion,
the only way you can find that the regulation in Puyallup II
discriminated against the Indians is to assume that the
Indians have some kind of inherent right to engage in a
commercial fishing enterprise that non-Indians do not have
and to conclude that requiring Indians to observe the
same rules as non-Indians is therefore somehow "discriminatory."
Apart from the fact that this theory is inconsistent with
your earlier interpretation of the treaties at p. 2 as
affording Indians and non-Indians "precisely the same right
to fish," I know of no evidence that supports it.
As I
see it, the "discrimination" disapproved of in Puyallup II
was precisely the same as is involved in this case--under
preexisting policies, non-Indians could, but Indians could
not, take substantial numbers of fish.
I sympathize with your concern about this case, but it
seems to me we must either overrule Pu'yall'l1p II or give the
Indians a share of the fish.
Respectfully,

fLMr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

CHAMBERS OF

June 15, 1979

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

78-119 - Washington v. United States, etc.

Dear Lewis:
Please add my name to your dissenting
opinion in these cases.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

e
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

June 15, 1979

Re: Nos. 77-983, 78-ll9 & 78-139 - Washington fish cases

Dear John,
I agree with you that, whether sound or not, our prior cases
construing the relevant Indian treaties conclude that the Indians not
only were guaranteed a right of access and a right to fish in their
accustomed places, but also were assured that the white man would
not prevent fish from arriving in those places and that some portion
of those fish would be reserved for them. To some lesser or greater
extent, I understand that Lewis is to the contrary and hence, to me,
he would at least partially overrule some of our prior cases. I am
unprepared to do that, at least without reargument.
At Conference I was uncertain that a 50-50, or a mere 50-50
allocation was mandated by the treaties; and although Puyallup III at
least tacitly held that the steelhead allocation was not inconsistent
with the treaties, you clearly recognize that none of our cases has
predetermined a precise allocation of the salmon runs, except, of
course, for the fish that must escape for conservation purposes.
After all, the words "in common" cannot possibly have meant a 5050 division between the contracting parties in each of the various
treaties negotiated and executed with particular Indian tribes.
Although I have difficulty accepting the notion that the treaties
guaranteed to the Indians, or to a single Indian if he was the only
Indian fisherman, 50% of the commercial salmon harvest in perpetuity,
I also have difficulty in arriving at a principal basis for reserving to
the Indians any lesser share of the harvest, over and above the fish

,
-2-

needed for ceremonial and subsistence purposes. The latter portion,
I take it, small as it likely is, no one would quibble about. If the
tribe, or any Indian fisherman, claimed enough fish to feed the tribe,
free or for pay, such a claim would have priority, I suppose. But
this would seem to be a drop in the bucket and would very likely be
satisfied by merely a right of access and a right to fish commercially
in the accustomed places. Indeed, the argument against you seems
to be that whatever share the Indians are entitled to, given access,
license-free fishing, and an ability to fish, which many of them obviously have, that share is no more than they are capable of taking
when they fish in the customary places but "in common" with nonIndians who are also fishing there.
It should also be recalled that the tribal members may fish
in the customary spots in unlimited numbers, as long as there is the
required escapement. They also may fish, if licensed, in areas other
than the treaty areas, including the ocean fisheries controlled by the
United States; and in these other areas they may not only take fish
that are destined for treaty fishing areas but also those fish (over
half of the case area salmon, you suggest) that will not enter any of
the customary Indian fishing locations.

As you can see, I am somewhat up in the air. However, if the
case is not to be reargued and I must choose between your draft and
Lewis' dissent, I would join in making your opinion an opinion for the
Court. Of course, if reargued I might still come out that way. My
first choice is to set the case for reargument, although I could understand that a majority mig·ht well believe that we shall learn little more
than we do not already know. Even so, the issues might mature in
our own minds, given a little more time and thought.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
erne

Supreme Court of the United States
Memorandum
---------------- ---------------------· 19--------
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:

77-983, 78-119, and 78-139 - ~.Vashington
v. Fishing Vessel Association

In order to emphasize the point that I propose
that "reasonable livelihood needs"--rather than the 50%
ceiling--should provide the primary standard for ·
measuring the Indians' share of the fish, I would
like to substitute the attached pages 11, 26, 27, and
28 of my original memorandum.
It seems to me the point is of sufficient
importance to merit study before we decide whether
or not reargument is necessary.
Respectfully,

j/L
Attachments

77-!JE.;3, 78-119 &
W.\.SHlXGTO~

11 .

7S-130-~IE1\l0

FISIIl~G YESSEL ASSN.

-·u

·or to their needs. whichevrr was kss. The Department of
Fisheries agreed that the Indians were entitled to rra fair and
equitable share" stat~cl in terms of a percentage of the harvestablc salmon in the area; ultimately it proposed a share
of one-third . :~
.
Only the Game Departmc'nt thought the treaties providea
no assurancr to the I nclians that they could take some portion
·of each run of fish. That agency instrad argued that the
treati<>s gave the Indians no fishing rights not enjoyed by nontreaty fishermen rxcept the two rights previously recognizea
by decisions of this Court-the right of access over private
lands to their usual and accustomed fishing grounds, see
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 240 U. S. 194, United
States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371. and an exemption from the
pay.tnent of license fees. Sec Tulee v. Washington, 315 U. S.
'681.
The District Court agreecl with the parties who advocated
an allocation to the Indians, and it essentially agreec.l with the
United States as to \vhat that allocation should be. It held
that the Indians are entitled to a 457c to 507'o share of the
harvcstable fish that \vill at some point pass through n'cog-·
nized tribal fishing grounds in the caf;e area. (?oiiglliHeantly,
11

@"PI'

hnlf pf the=-rula.dwmpps Gsh 'll tlw C:li!Q RHHi ''"' uot pll'i:il

thr01:1gh sueh grounds :.~.nd ~u·Q €'>·cmpt from the orclnr) The
share was to be calculated on a river-by-river, run-by-run
basis, subject to certain adjustments. Fish caught by Indians
for ccr<'monial and subsistrnce purpos<'s as well as fish caught
within a reservation were <'Xcluded from the calculation of"
the trib<.'s' share.!G Ill addition, in order to compensate for
fish caught outside of the case area, i. e., beyond the State's
portion of the PugP! Souncl \\':tlrr,Jwd, the watrr~lwcl,- of thr Ol~·mpic
Prninsula north of the Gra~·~ llarhor \rtl!C'r"ht>d, Hild the offshore waters
adjacC'nt to tho:;:e arra"." :3R-4 F. , upp ., at 328.
10 l\Iorrovrr, fi,;h raught. b~· indi\'idunl Indian~ at off-rrsNvat ion locations thn.t. aro not '·u ~ unl and :trc·u:-;tomrd" "ite,;, was trc•ated as if it had ·
been caught. by non treaty fbhrmwn. :3~4 F. SUJlJl., at 410.

, II-

77-983, 78-119 and 78-1.39 -Washington v. Fish4ng Vesse, Assn.

Insert

15A/The Sol.icitor General estimates that over half of the
anadromous fish in the case area do not pass through such
grounds and a r e exempt from the orde~ Brief for the Un4ted
States, at 72-73. This estimate 4s cons4stent with the State's
figures on the number of salmon caught in 1977, see JA 635-63q,
which indicate that the Indians caught only about 1.8% of the
fish taken in the case area that year. Of course, the Indians
claim that they were prevented from catching as many fish that
year as they were entitled to under the District ~ourt's order
because of interference by non-Indian fishermen, but even if
the 18% figure were increased by the amount of fish the Indians
claim they should have caught, see Brief of Respondent Indian
Tribes, at 72, n. 273, the Indians' take would on1v amount to
about 20% of the total number of fish taken in the- case area.
'J;'he State and the commercial fishing associ.ations no not
directly dispute either the Sol ici_tor Genera, 's estimate Of:' the
Indians' representations concernjng the number of fish they
should have caught under the D4strict rourt's order.
Nonetheless, they do repeatedly refer to the District _ ~ourt's
order as awarding half or more of the fish taken in the case
area to the Indjans. According1.y, a factua, c1ispute exists on
the question of what percentage of the fish in the case area
actually pass through Indian fish4ng areas and are therefore
subject to the Distl':'{ct Court's allocations an~, in the absence ,
of any relevant findings by the courts below, we are unable to ·
express any view on the matter.

- 1/A ..

77-!J~:~,

20

7H- ll!l & 78--1:39-1\IEi\10

WASHlNGTON v. FISHING VESSEL ASSN.

~-.s---......;I;..:.t;.;.H;.;.Ii.;.;.ar_,s..,·' livelihood needs would be met.

Arizo11a v. Califoruia, supra, 37a lJ. S., at 600; Winters, supra.. Sec Winans,
supra, 198 U. S., at 384. This is precisely what the District
Court did hPn·. excppt that it realized that some ceiling should
be plac('d on tht• Indians' apportionment to prevent their
Jlcrds from exhausting the crttire resourcP and thereby frustt·ating tlw trca ty right of ''all other citizens of the territory."
Thus, it first concluded that at the time the treaties wore
signed. the Indians, who comprised three-fourths of the territorial population, deprndPd heavily on anadromous fish as a
source of food, commerce. and cultural cohesion. Indeed, it
found that the non - lrJdian population depPnded on lmlians. to
catch the fish that the fonnt•r consumed. See pp. 4-9. and n.
8, supra. Ouly then did it determine that the l ndian 's present-clay subsistenc(' and commercial needs should be met, subject, of course, to the 50~ ceiling. 2 6 384 F. Supp., at 342343.

c

<!/It must be remembered, however, that the 50% figu~e imposes
a maximum but not a minimum a11ocation. As in Arizona v.
California and its predecessor cases, the central principle
here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource
that once was thoroughly and exc~usive1y explo5ted by the
Indians secures so much as, but not more than, is necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood--that is to say, a
moderate living. Accordingly, while the maximum possible
allocation to the Indi.ans is fixed at 50%,l§/ the minimum is
not; the latter will_, upon proper submissions to the District
Court, be modified in response to changing ci~cumstances. If,
for example, a tribe should dwindle to iust a few membets, o~
if it should find other sources of support that lea~ it to
abandon its fisheries, a 45 or 50% all.ocation of an entire run
that passes through its customary fjshing g~ounds would be ~
manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of the tr~6e
under those circumstances could not reasonably require an
allotment of large numbers of fish.
~bJ

~Tfie-1oglC of the District Court's

I

.

507r ceiling is a so mamfest. For an equal division-especially between parties who
presumptively treated \\'ith each other as equals-is suggested,
if not necessarily dictated, by the word "common" as it appears in the treaties. Since the days of Solomon, such a division has been accepted as a fair apportionment of a common
as et, aml A11glo-Ameriean common law has presumed that
division when, as here•. no other percentage is suggestrd by
the language of the agreement or the surrounding circumstances. E. g., 2 American Law~f Property ~ 6.5 ~ 19 (A.

11-0R3, 78-110 & 78-109-1\IEMO

WASllf1\CTOX v. FISITII\G VESSEL ASSN.

.
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Casner eel. 19.52); E. Hopkins, Handbook on the Law of Real
Property ~ 200, at 336 ( 1R9G).
Although the District Court's exercise of its discretion, as
slightly modified by the Court of Appeals, see n. 17, supra,
is in most respects unobjectionable, I am not satisfied that
all of the adjustments it made to its division are consistent
with the preceding analysis.
The District Court determined that the fish taken by the
Indians on their reservations should not be counted against
their share. It based this determination on the fact that Indians have the exclusive right under the treaties to fish on
their reservations. But this fact seems to me to have no
greater significance than the f~~ct that some nontreaty fishermen may have exclusive access to fishing sites that are not
11
usual and accustomed" places. Shares in the fish runs
should not be affected by the place where the fish are taken.
Cf. Puyallup Ill, 433 U. S., at 173-177. 27 J therefore dis"
agree with the District Court's exclusion of the Indians' onreservation catch from their portion of the runs. 28
This same rationale, however, validates the Court-of- \
Appea.ls-modified equitable adjustment for fish caught outside the jurisdiction of the State by nontreaty fishermen from
Thi;: Court 'o drr·i .:on in Puyallup I 11, which approvrd ~tntr rrgulation of on-rcsrrvation fi~hing m the iutcrc::;t of con~<:>rvation, was issu<:>d
after the District Court. rxcluclC'd the Indians' on-resC'rvntion take aud the
Court of App<'ais affirnl('cl. See 520 F. 2d, at 690. There is snb"tantial
doubt in my mind that. tho~c <·ourts would have decided the question as
they did had Puyallup I 11 been on the book~.
2
~ A likr n'asonillg r<:>quirr~ thr fi:<h taken by trrat~· fi:;hermC'n off of
the rc~ervation;; and at. location:; othrr than "u:;nal and accustomed" sites,
sec n. 16, supra, to be count<>d a· part of th<:> Indian~ share. Of cour::e,
the District Court, in it;; discrC'tion, mn~· detPrmine that so few fish fit into
this, or any othrr, category (e . g., '·take-home" fi~h caught by non-treaty
commrrcial fi,:lwrnwn for pcr:.:onal u~e) that, accounting for them incli,·iclually is unnecC':;:;ary, and that an r,:timat<:>d figure may be relied 011 in
making the annual comput:1tion. Jndrrd, if th<:> amount is truly de
minimis, no a(.•cotmting at all may be required.
27
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the State of Washillgton. Seen. 17, supra, and accompanying
text. f'o long as they take fish from identifiable ru11s that
are destinrcl for traditional tribal fishing grounds, such persons
may not rely on the location of their take to justify excluding
it from the1r shan•. Although it is true that the fish involved
are caught in \\'atcrs subject to the j.urisdiction of the 'Gnitcd
States, rather than of tlw State, sec 16 C. S. C. ~ 1811-1812,
the pen:o1is catching them arc nonetheless "citizens of the
territory" and as such the ueneficiaries of the Indians' reciprocal grant of land in tlw tr aties as well as the person's expressly named in the treaties as sharing fishing rights \vith the
IndiallS. Accordingly. they may justifiably be treated differently from nonkcaty fishermen who are not citizens of
Washington. The statutory provisions just cited are therefore important in this context only because they clearly place
a responsibility on the United States, rather than the State, to
police the take of fish ill the relevant waters by \Vashington
citizens insofar as is necessary to assure compliance with the
treaties.
On the other hand, as loug as there are enough fish to satisfy
the Indians' ceremonial and subsistence needs, I see no justification for the District Court's exclusion from the treaty share
of fish caught for these purposes. We need not now decide
whether priority for such uses would be required in a. period
of short supply in order to carry out the purposes of the
treaty. See 384 F. Supp., at 343. For present purposes, I
would merely hold that the total catch-rather than the
com1 wrcial catch-is the measure of each party's right.~ 0
The Govcrnnwni ,;uggc~ t::; that th<' D1st nct Comt',; rxclu~ion of the
"takc-homr" catch of nontrraty fislH'rmcn from the nontreaty share
makes up for any losses to tho~e fi shc·rmen occasioned by the exclusion
of the Indians' cercmomal and sub>'i~tcnc<' take. I sec nothing in the
District. Court.'s findings to verify th1::; all<'gntiOn, see 38<1 F. Supp., at 343,
nthough the Di,;trict Court mny WISh to nddrcs::; the is"ue in thi:; light on
remand.
Although therr· is SOlll<' dis<·ussion in the briefs conrrming whrthcr th()
21'

Accordjng:ly, any fish (1. ) taken in Nashington waten> or in
United States waters off the coast of washington an~ r~\ ta~en
from runs of fish that pass through the In~ians' usua1 an~
accustomed fishing grounds and (3) taken by either memhe~s of
the Indian tr~bes that are parties to this 1itigation, on the
one hand, or by non-Indian citizens of Nashington, on the other
hand, shall count against that party's respective share of the
fish.
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THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

Re:

June 18, 1979

(77-983 - Washington v. Washington State Commercial
(
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n.
(

(7 8-119 - Washington v. U.S.
(

(78-139 - Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n. v.
USDC for the Western District of Wash.

(

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
John has done a "noble" job but I suspect he would
agree that his approach is really an "arbitration"
holding. Developing a principled basis for decision here
is extremely difficult.
I do not know whether time will help, but I join
Byron in opting for a re-argument.
Regards,

/

<!Jonrlllf tlrt ~lt ~tlrl:ti\'
~M.!p:ngitttt.l9. <!J. 2.0,?~~

;§u:p:uuu

I

,.'

C HA MBE R S O F

JUST ICE J OHN PAUL S T E V E NS

'.
June 18, 1979

.

'

RE:

77-983, 78-119, 78-139 - Washington v. Fishing
Vessel Association

Dear Chief:
Would it not be appropriate to have a Conference
discussion of this case before voting on Byron's
reargument suggestion?

"I..,

I appreciate your compliment on my "noble"
effort, but I am rather surprised by your comment
that my memorandum proposes an "arbitration" holding.
Respectfully,

fk

..

_.,

·"'

''

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
•• !'

"'·,1

.:§u:vunu <.!JLllttlllf tqt ~llnittb' .®faltg ,
~ru¥lfinghttt, ~. <.!J. 20~'!$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN P AUL S T EVE N S

I

\

June 18, 1979

Re:

77-983, 78-119, and 78-139 - Washington v.
Fishing Vessel Association

Dear Byron:
Thank you for your thoughtful letter of June 15th.
As you suggest, there are no easy answers to the problems
raised by this case and especially to the question of
what share of fish the treaties, as interpreted by our
prior cases, afford the Indians. Nonetheless, it may be
useful to make a few comments on some of the points you
have made in your letter.
First, I should emphasize that I did not intend in
my memorandum to assure the Indians 50% of the fish in
perpetuity~ the 50% figure was merely intended to establish
the ~xtmum amount that the Indians could take if their
"livelihood needs" reasonably justify that amount.
If, as
you hypothesize, a tribe should dwindle to just one member,
or only a handful, a 50% allocation of an entire run would
be manifestly inappropriate because the livelihood of a
small group of persons could not reasonably require an
allotment of millions of fish.
Second, I really think it is clear that the "access"
approach that Lewis advocates--even if supplemented by the
fish the Indians catch outside of the treaty areas--would
not assure the Indians an amount of fish consistent with
the intent of the treaties. As I understand the figures,
the access approach would not even satisfy the Indians'
subsistence and ceremonial needs.
Before the District
Court's decree went into effect, the Indians were catching
only about 2 to 3 1/2% of the runs, 459 F. Supp., at 1032,

,.
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whereas the Diitrict Court found that their subsistence
and ceremonial needs in later years required about 5%
(see J.A. 593). More importantly, merely satisfying
ceremonial and subsistence needs can hardly be the proper
allocation because the findings make it clear that the
Indians did have an established trade and commerce in fish
in the 1850's.
The fact that the Indians had a virtual monopoly of
the fisheries when the treaties were made makes the
analogy to the water cases relevant.
You will recall that
Arizona v. California and other cases hold that Indian
treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly
and exclusively exploited by the Indians should secure
enough of that resource to provide the Indians with a livelihood--that is to say, a moderate living.
I should think a
similar approach is proper with respect to fish, modified
only by the fact that we impose an absolute ceiling of 50%
on the Indians' allocation of fish whereas I don't recall
that anx such ceiling was imposed in any of the water cas.es.
I have mixed feelings about your suggestion that the
case should be reargued.
Certainly I would agree that the
case is much too important to let the investment we have
made this Term be decisive.
On the other hand, I am not
sure we will get much more help on the allocation problem
than is already available in the hundreds of pages of briefs
that have already been filed.
The new question that we might
suggest for reargument is whether or not P~allup II should
b~ overruled.
I have thought a good deal ~out that sugg~stio~ /
\ s1nce we talked about the case the other day, but wonder 1f
"' '
it would be wise for the Court to advance that suggestion
when none of the parties and none of the amicus briefs shed
any doubt on the validity of the case.
It seems to me it
would be quite awkward for the Court to be expressing doubt
about such an imt ortant case so shortly after it was decided.
Alffiougfi I h ave a d ser i ous doubts about whether the case
was correctly decided--particularly when I was working on
Puyallup III--I really am persuaded now that the Court did
reach the correct result there and almost certainly would
reaffirm its holding if the point should be squarely addressed
again.
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As an alternative to your reargument suggestion, I
wonder if it might be useful to try and schedule another
conference devoted specifically to this case and nothing
else to see if there is some modified position that could
command a court. After all, my assignment was merely to
prepare a memorandum. for further consideration and discussion by the Court and we really have not had any such
collegial review of the case since my memorandum was circulated.
In all events, I appreciate your careful study of the
case.

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

June 18, 1979
"'.•.,.
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Dear John:
As a sideline observer, though not entirely a
disinterested one, I have read with interest the exchange
between you and Byron.
Having had my "say", I do not intend to get into
the middle of this friendly debate, but I will address one
point. In your letter of June 18, you identify as perhaps
the only question open for reargument is "whether or not
Puyallup II should be overruled". You also say that "it
would be quite awkward for the Court to be expressing doubt
about such an important case so shortly after it
decided".•
.~While I cheerfully recognize that you and I read
Puyallup II differently, I do suggest - for reasons stated in
pr1or correspondence and in my dissent - that reasonable
lawyers and judges may conclude that Puyallup II is not
nearly so broad a decision as you view 1t. Normally, a case
may be construed to hold only what was necessary for the
judgment on the issue presented. No general question of
apportionment was before the Court in Puyallup II. While the
language could be construed more broadly, tfie fact is that
the case turned on the discriminatory effect of a state
regulation as applied only to the facts before the Court. ;
A reargument could address, as one question, the
scope of the holding in Puyallup II. But if we have a
reargument, as suggested by the Chief Justice and Byron,
would prefer - in addition - to keep all issues open for
reconsideration.
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To: The Chief J,stioe
Hr. Juetic t. JJr..;nnan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Yr. Just1oe lbite
Mr. Ju.etloe l«arshall
Mr. Just toe ~la.olatl•m
Ur. Just t~~.$ RoghnQ ni st
Mr. Justice Steven s

From: Mr. .Jut1oe Powell

?rt~
lstfpRAFT

ct.l'olllaM4: .__,._ _ __

~1 S JUN 1979

·suPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Nos. 77- 983, 78---119, AND 78---139
State of Washington et al.,
Petitioners,
On Writ of Certiorari to the
77-983
v.
Supreme Court of WashWashington State Commercial
ington.
Passenger Fishing Vessel
Association et al.
State of Washington et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
78-119
United States et al.
Puget Sound Gillnetters
On Writs of Certiorari to the
Association et al.,
United States Court of ApPetitioners,
peals for the Ninth Circuit.
78- 139
v.
United States District Court
for the Western District of
Washington (United States
et al. , Real Parties in
Interest).
[June -, 1979']
MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whom MR. JusTICE STEWART \
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
I join Parts I-III of the Court's opinion. I am not in agreement, however, with the Court's interpretation of the treaties
negotiated in 1854 and 1855 with the Indians of the Washington Territory. The Court's opinion, as I read it, construes
the treaties' provision "to take fish ... in common" as guaranteeing the Indians a specified percentage of the runs of the
anadromous fish passing land upon which the Indians tradi·
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tionally have fished. Indeed, it takes as a starting point for
determining fishing rights an equal division of these fish between Indians and non-Indians. Ante, at 25 et seq. As I do
not believe that the language and history of the treaties can
be construed to support the Court's interpretation, I dissent.

I
At issue in these cases is the meaning of language found in
six similar Indian treaties negotiated and signed in 1854 and
1855. 1 Each of the treaties provides substantially that "[t]he
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and
stations is further secured to said Indians, in common with all
citizens of the Territory, and of erecting temporary houses for
the purpose of curing." 2 The question before us is whether
this "common" fishing right is a right only of access to usual I
and accustomed fishing sites for the purpose of fishing there,
or includes the greater right to exclude others from taking a
particular portion of thE' fish that pass through the sites. As
thE' Court observes, at the time the treaties were signed there
was no need to address this question, for thE' surfeit of fish I
made lack of access to fishing areas the only constraint upon
supply. Nonetheless. I believe that the compelling inference
to be drawn from the language and history of the treaties is
that the Indians sought and retained only the right to go to
their accustomed fishing places and there to fish along with
non-Indians. In addition. the Indians retained the exclusive
right to take fish on their reservations. a right not involved in
this litigation. In short, they have a right of access to fish.
1 Treaty of ME>dicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132; Treaty of Point Elliott, 12
Stat. 927; Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933; Trf'aty with the
Makahs. 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951; Treaty of
Olympia, 12 Stat. 971.
2 Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra, at 1133.
TherE' werE' some ~light,
immat.f'rial variations in the language used. See, e. g., Treaty with the
\
Yakimas, quoted infra, at 3.
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Nothing in the language of the treaties indicates that any
party understood that constraints would be placed on the
amount of fish that anyone could take, or that the Indians
would be guaranteed a percentage of the catch. Quite to
the contrary, the language confers upon non-Indians precisely
the same right to fish that it confers upon Indians, even in
those areas where the Indians traditionally had fished.
United States v. Winans, 198 U. S. 371 ( 1905). As it cannot
be argu~d that Congress intended to guarantee non-Indians
any spe~ified percentage of the available fish , there is neither
force n~r logic to the argument that the same languagethe "right to take fish "-does guarantee such a percentage to
Indians.;
This conclusion is confirmed by the lanaguage used in the
treaty 1egotiated with the Yakima Tribe, which explicitly
inch·des what apparently is implicit in each of the treaties:
the Indians' right to take fish on their reservations is exclusive. Thus, the Yakima treaty provides that "[t]he exclusive
right of!taking fish in all the streams where running through
or bord! ring said reservation, is further secured to said confederated tribes and bands of Indians, as also the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common
with citizf'ns of the Territory .... " 12 Stat. 951. See ante,
at - -. i There is no reason apparent from the language used
in the treaties why the "right of taking fish" should mean one
thing for purposes of the exclusive right of reservation fishing
and quite another for purposes of the "common" right of fishing at usual and accustomed places. Since the Court interprets the right of taking fish in common to be an entitlement
to half bf the entire catch taken from fisheries passing the Indians' traditional fishing grounds, it therefore should follow
that th~ Court would interpret the exclusive right of taking
fish to be an entitlement to all of the fish taken from fisheries
passing the Indian 's reservations. But the Court apparently
concedes. that this exclusive right is not of such draconian.

·.
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proportions. Indeed, the Court would reduce the Indians'
50% portion by those fish caught on the reservation. The
more reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that when the Indians
and Governor Stevens agreed upon a "right of taking fish,"
they understood this right to be one of access to fish-exclusive
access with respect to fishing places on the reservation, a11d
common a.ccess with respect to fishing places off of the
reservation. 8
In addition to the language of the treaties, the historical
setting in which they were negotiated supports the inference
that the fishing rights secured for the Indians were rights of
access alone. The primary purpose of the six treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens was to resolve growing disputes
between the settlers claiming title to land in the Washington
Territor:y under the Land Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 437,
and the Indians who had occupied the land for generations.
Under tpe bargain struck in the treaties, the Indians ceded
their claims to vast tracts of land, retaining only certain specified areas as reservations, where they would have exclusive
rights o~ possession and use. In exchange, the Indian tribes
were given substantial sums of money aud were promised
various forms of aid. See, e. g., Treaty of Medicine Creek,
10 Stat. 1132. By thus separating the Indians from the settlers it was hoped that friction could be minimized.
The negotiators apparently realized, however, that restricting the lndians to relatively small tracts of land might interfere with their securing food. See Letter of George Gibbs
to Captain McClellan, App. 326 ("[the Indians] require the
3

Indeed, if the Court's interprE'tation of the treatiE's were correct, then
the exclusive right with respect to rE'scrvation fi;;hing would be largely
superfluous. If thE' Indians had the right to 50%, and no more, of the
fish irrespective of where the~' are caught, then it hardly would be of any
great valuE' to them that they could keep others from taking fish from
locations on the reservation. The mo. t reasonable way to interpret the
exclusive right of reservation fishing so that it was of value, therefore, is
as a special right of access.
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liberty of motion for the purpose of seeking, in their proper
season, roots, berries, and fish"). This necessary "liberty of
motion" was jeopardized by the title claims of the settlers
whose land abutted-or would abut-the waterways from
which fish traditionally had been caught. Thus, in Governor
Stevens' report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he
noted the tension between the land rights afforded settlers
under the 1850 Land Donation Act and the Indians' need to
have some access to the fisheries. Although he expressed the
view that "[i] t never could have been the intention of Con ..
gress that Indians should be excluded from their ancient
fisheries," he noted that "no condition to this effect was inserted in the donation act," and therefore recommended the
question "should be set a.t rest by law." Report of Governor
Stevens to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, App. 327.
Viewed within this historical context, the common fishing right
reserved to the Indians by the trea.ties of 1854 and 1855 could
only have been the right, over and above their exclusive fishing right on their reservations, to roam off of the reservations
in order to reach fish at the locations traditionally used by
the Indians for this purpose. On the other hand, there is no
historical indication that any of the parties to the treaties
understood that the Indians would be specifically guaranteed
some set portion of the fisheries to which they traditionally
had had access.
II
Prior decisions of this Court have prevented the dilution of
these treaty rights, but none has addressed the issue now before us. I read these decisions as supporting the interpretation set forth above. This is particularly true of United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) , the case most directly
relevant. In that case a settler had constructed several fish
wheels in the Columbia River. These fish wheels were built
at locations where the Indians traditionally had fished , and
11 1
necessita.te [ d] the exclusive possession of the space occupied
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by the wheels,' " id., at 380, thereby interfering with the
Indians' treaty right of access to fish. This Court reviewed
in some detail the precise nature of the Indians' fishing rights
under the Yakima Treaty, and concluded that the treaties)
" .. . reserved rights .. . to every individual Indian, as
though named therein. They imposed a servitude upon
every piece of land as though described therein. There
was an exclusive right of fishing reserved within certain
boundaries. There was a right outside of those boundaries reserved 'in common with citizens of the Territory.'
As a mere right, it was not exclusive in the Indians. Citizens might share it, but the Indians were secured in its
enjoyment by a special provision of means for its exercise. They were given "the right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places,' and the right 'of erecting temporary buildings for curing them.' The contingency of
the future ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen and provided for-in other words, the Indians were
given a right in the land- the right of crossing it to the
river-the right to occupy it to the extent and for the
purpose mentioned. No other conclusion would give
effect to the treaty." !d. , at 381 (emphasis added).
The Court thus viewed these treaties as intended to "giv[e]
a right in the land"-a "servitude'' upon all non-Indian
land-to enable Indians to fish "in common with citizens of
the Territory." The focus was on access to the traditional
fishing areas for the purpose of enjoying the "right of fishing." !d., at 380. The Winans Court concluded, on the
facts before it, that the right of access to fish in these areas
had been abridged. It stated that "in the actual taking of
fish white men may not be confined to a spear or crude net,
but it does not follow that they may construct and use a device which gives them exclusive possession of the fishing
places, as it is admitted a fish wheel does." I d., at 382
(emphasis added) . Thus, Winans was decided solely upon
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the basis of a treaty-secured right of access to fish. Moreover,
the Court's analysis of the treaty right at issue in Winans
strongly indicates that nothing more than a right of access
fairly could be inferred from the treaty. 4
Nor do the Puyallup cases interpret the treaties to require
that any specified proportion of the catch be reserved for Indians. Indeed, Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 391 U. S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I), consistently with
Winans, described the right of Indians under the treaties as
"the right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed places.'" Id.,
at 398." The issue before the Court in Puyallup I was the
extent to which the State could regulate fishing. It held that,
" ... the 'right' to fish outside the reservation was a treaty
'right' tha.t could not be qualified or conditioned by the
State. But 'the time and manner of fishing ... necessary for the conservation of fish,' not being defined or
established by the treaty, were within the reach of state
power."
The Government's brief in Winans , cited approvingly by the Court in
that case, indicates that the Government also understood the treaty to
guarantee nothing more than access rights to traditional fishing locations.
In that brief, the Government advocated only "a way of access, free ingress
and egress to and from the fishing grounds." Brief for Appellant, No. 180,
0. T. 1904, p. 56.
This interpretation of Winans was unequivocally affirmed by the Court
a short time later in Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 194
(1919) . At issue in that case was whether Indians from the Yakima
nation had the right under their treaty to cross the Columbia River and
fish from the south bank, which admittedly had belonged to other tribes
at the time of the treaty. The Court viewed Seufert, a case unquestionably involving only the right of access, to be squarely controlled by its
earlier decision in Winans. 249 U. S., at 198. Moreover, the Court
reaffirmed its view that the effect of the reservation of common fishing
rights to the Indian~ amounted to a servitude. !d., at 199.
5 The treaty right was repeatedly referred to in Puyallup I as a "right
to fish ." This phrase was used no less than seven times in the course
of the opinion, with no distinction being made between the right "to fish"
and the right "to take fish." !d., at 397-99.
4
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The Court today finds support for its views in Puyallup I
because the Court there recognized that. apart from conservation measures, the State could not impose restrictive regulations on the treaty rights of Indians. But it does not follow
from this that an affirmative right to a specified percentage
of the catch is guaranteed by the treaties to India11s or to nonIndians, for the Court misapprehends the nature of the basic
right sought to be preserved by Congress. This, as noted
above, was a right of the Indians to reach their usual and accustomed fishing areas. Put differently, this right, described
in Winans as a servitude or right over land not owned by the
Indians, entitles the Indians to trespass on any land when
necessary to reach their traditional fishing areas, and is a right
not enjoyed by non-Indian residents of the area.
In permitting the State to place limitations on the Indians'
access rights when conservation so requires. the Court went
farther in Puyallup I and sugl!ested that even regulations thus
justified would have to satisfy the requirements of "equal protection implicit in the phrase 'in common with.' " 391 U. S.,
at 403. Accordingly, in Washington Game Department v.
Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup ll). we considered whether the conservation measures taken by the State
had been evenhanded in the treatment of the Indians. At
issue was a Washington State ban on all net fishing-by both
Indians and non-Indians-for steelhead trout in the Puyallup
River. According to testimony before the trial court, the
annual run of steelhead trout in the Puyallup River was between 16,000 and 18.000, while unlimited sport fishing would
result in the taking of between 12,000 and 14,000 steelhead
annually. Because the escape of at least 25% of the entire
run was required for hatcheries and spawning, the sport fishing totally pre-empted all commercial fishing by Indians. The
State therefore imposed a ban on all net fishing. The Indians
claimed that this ban amounted to an improper subordination
of their treaty rights to the privilege of recreational fishing
enjoyed by non-Indians.
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We held in Puyallup II that the ban on net fishing, as
it applied to Indians covered by treaty, was an infringement
of their rights. The State in the name of conservation was
discriminating against the Indians "because all Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing entirely preempted by non-Indians, is allowed." 414 U. S., at 48. 'Because " [ o] nly an expert could fairly estimate what degree of
net fishing plus fishing by hook and line would allow the
escapement of fish necessary for perpetuation of the speciest
id., at 48, we remanded to the Washington courts for a fair apportionment of the steelhead run between Indian net fishing
and non-Indian sport fishing.
Relying upon the reference in Puyallup II to "apportion.
ment," the Court expansively reads the decision in that case
as strongly implying, if not holding, that the catch at Indians'
"accustomed" fishing sites must be apportioned between Indian and non-Indian fishermen. This view certainly is not a
necessary reading of Puyallup II. Indeed, I view it as a
quite unjustified extension of that case. Puyallup II addressed an extremely narrow question; where there had been
"discrimination" by state regulations under which "all Indian
net .fishing [was] barred and only hook and line fishing entirely pre-empted by non-Indians, fwas] allowed." !d., at 48.
In any event, to the extent language in Puyallup II may be
read as supporting some general apportionment of the catch,
it is dictum that is plainly incompatible with the language and
historical understanding of these treaties. 6
Emerging from our decisions in Winans, Puyallup I, and
1 Having decided tlmt some regulation was required, but that the treaty
forbad the State to choosr to regulate only Indian fishing for conservation
purposrs, we remanded for an apportionment between net fishing and sport
fishing. Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept ., 433 U.S. 165 (1977)
(Puyallup III), is of little assistance in deciding the issue in the present
cases. The Court in that case decided only that the regulations permitted
in Puyallup I could be applied against Indian fishing on the reservati®&,
as well as off of them.
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Puyallup II, therefore, is the proper approach to interpreta-tion of the Indians' common fishing rights at the present
time, when demand outstrips supply. The Indians have the
right to go to their traditional fishing grounds to fish. Once
there, they cannot be restricted in their methods or in the
size of their take, save insofar as restrictions are required for
conserving the fisheries from which they draw. Even in situations where such regulations are required, however, the State
must be evenhanded in limiting Indian and non-Indian fishing
activity. It is not free to make the determination-apparently made by Washington with respect to the ban on net fishing in the Puyallup River-that Indian fishing rights will be
totally subordinated to the interests of non-Indians.

III
In my view, the District Court below-and now this
Court-has formulated an apportionment doctrine that can"
not be squared with the language or history of the treaties, or
indeed with the prior decisions of this Court. The application of this doctrine, and particularly the construction of the
term "in common" as requiring a basic 50-50 apportionment,
is likely to result in an extraordinary economic windfall to
Indian fishermen in the commercial fish market by giving
them a substantial position in the market wholly protected
from competition from non-Indian fisherman .7 Indeed, non-

f

7

The Court apparently s£'es this windfall as being necessary alms for
the Indi a n ~ , for it concludes that "in light of th£' far superior numbers,
ca pital rr~ ourc es, and technology of the non-Indians, the concept of the
Indians' 'equal opportuni ty' to take advantage a scarce resource is likely
. in prac tice to mean that the Indians' 'right of taking fish' will net them
virtually no ca tch at all ." Ante, at 17 n . 21. But if the plight of the
India n:-; in the P acific Northwest requires that special provisi:ms be made
·for their livelihood, this Court should not £'nact these provisions by
reform ing a barga in ~ tru ck more than t wo hundred yea rs ago. Nor should
the cost of recompensing the Indians for their past losses fall only on the
shoulders of the commercial fishermen of the State of Wa::>hington-a very
small port ion of the people who benefitt ed from the di::;plarr,ment of the

.•
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Indian fishermen apparently will be required from time to
time to stay out of fishing areas completely while Indians
catch their Court-decreed allotment. In sum, the District
Court's decision will discriminate quite unfairly against nonIndians.8
I
Indians. This is a problem for re,;ulntion b~· Cor.grPss. It has the basic
responsibility for making ::;ure that Indians are not discriminated against,
and that tlwir rights arC' fully protected. In the exercise of this re<>ponsibility Congress could pnr:sue various avenues for relief of any perceived
discrimination or disadvantage. It could, for example, provide for Indian
fishermen the modern technology and capital resources that they lack,
thereby f'nabling them to compete on an equal basi~; with non-Indian
fi::;hermen. Moreover, a legislative resolution of this problem can protect
the interests of Indians without impo::;ing substantially the entire cost upon
non-Indian fh;hermen of the State of W:~~hington .
8 In addition to the burdens placed upon non-Indian fi~;hermen, the
Court'~; decision i::; likely to prove difficult to enforce fairly and effectively. To date, the District Court has had to resort to the outer limits
of its equitable powers in order to enforce its decree. This has included
takirg over superdEion of all of the commercial fishing in the Puget
Sound area, ordering thr creation of a telephone "hot line" that fishermen
ran u~;e to drtermine when and where they may legally fish, and ordering·
United States Marshals to board fishing craft and inspect for violations
of the court's preliminary injunction. Indeed, in his response to the petition for certiorari in the present case, the Solicitor General set forth in
some detail the cxtraord;nary difficulty the Government has hnd in enforcing the Di;;trict Court's drcr~s, Ra~·ing:
" ... the default of the state government has required the United States to
concentrate a disproportionate amount of its limited fisheries enforcement
persrmnel on what is essentially a local enforcement problem. Agents of
1he National Marine Fisheries Service, the Unitrd Statrs Fish and Wildlife Scn•ice, the United States Mar~;ha!s Service, and the Coast Guard
ha"e lwcn diverted from their regular duties to assist the district court in
implcmrntmg the Indians' treaty rights. This has resulted in a redurtion
111 tlw federal fisheri e~ services available for the rest of the country and for
thC' enforcement of the ocean fi~heries programs governed by the Fishery
Conservation Management Act of 1976." Brief of Respondent on Petition for Certiorari, at 20.
The;;e problems, it seem~ to me, will be exacerbated by a formula appor'tiomnent StLch as that urdered by th<~ C€1'lll't..
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To be sure, if it were necessary to construe the treaties
to produce these results, it would be our duty so to construe
them. But for the reasons stated above, I think the Court's
construction virtually ignores the historical setting and purposes of the treaties, considerations that bear compellingly
upon a proper reading of their language. Nor do the prior
decisions of this Court support or justify what seems to me to
be a substantial reformation of the bargain struck with the
Indians in 1854- 1855.
I would hold that the treaties give to the Indians two significant rights that should be respected. As made clear in
Winans, the purpose of the treaties was to assure to Indians
the right of access over private lands so that they could continue to fish at their usual and accustomed fishing grounds.
Indians also have the exclusive right to fish on their reservations, and are guaranteed enough fish to satisfy their ceremonial and subsistence needs. Moreover. as subsequently
construed, the treaties exempt Indians from state regulation
(including the payment of license fees) except that necessary
for conservation in the interest of all fishermen. Finally,
under Puyallup II, it is settled that even a facially neutral
conservation regulation is invalid if its effect is to discriminate
against Indian fishermen. These rights, privileges. and exemptions-possessed only by Indians-are quite substantial.
I find no basis for according them additional advantages.
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